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REFORMING U.S. TRADE POLICY TO PROTECT THE 
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT: A MULTILATERAL 
APPROACH 
Kevin C. Kennedy* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Responsible governments wrestle daily with such issues as 
preventing war, ensuring respect for human rights, protecting the 
environment, and maintaining an open world trading system. Con-
sider the following three events. First, Libya is suspected of spon-
soring terrorist attacks at the Rome and Vienna airports. In March 
1982, President Reagan declares a national emergency under the 
authority of the International Emergency Economic Powers Actl 
and imposes a fairly comprehensive ban on trade with Libya.2 
Second, protestors demanding political reform in the People's Re-
public of China are massacred in Tiananmen Square, Beijing, in 
June 1989. Thereafter, the U.S. government pressures China to 
improve its human rights policies by linking annual renewal of 
China's most-favored-nation ("MFN") trading status to its human 
rights record.3 Third, Mexican fishermen use a method of catching 
tuna that results in an unacceptably high dolphin mortality rate. 
The United States responds in 1990 with a ban on canned tuna 
imports from Mexico, under.authority of the Marine Mammal Pro-
tection Act. 4 Though these three events differ in time, space, and 
subject matter, they all share one common element: each event led 
the United States to impose trade sanctions in response to activities 
that the United States deemed unacceptable. The practice of im-
* Professor of Law, Detroit College of Law. Visiting Professor of Law, Vermont 
Law School (1993-94). J.D. 1977, Wayne State University School of Law; LL.M., Harvard 
Law School, 1982. 
1. 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1988). 
2. See JOHN H. JACKSON & WILLIAM J. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 925 n.l (2d ed. 1986). 
3. See Ben Barber, Clinton's Foreign Policy Brings New Emphasis to Human Rights, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 15, 1993, at 2. On May 28, 1993, President Clinton 
announced that he would renew China's MFN trading status, conditioned upon improve-
ments in China's human rights record. See Paul Quinn Judge, Renewal Set For China Trade 
Status, BOSTON GLOBE, May 28, 1993, at 1. 
4. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421(a) (1988). See Stephen J. Porter, Note, The Tuna/Dol-
phin Controversy: Can the GATT Become Environment-Friendly? 5 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. 
REV. 91 (1992). 
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posing trade sanctions on national security grounds, as in the case 
of the trade sanctions imposed on Libya, is time-honored but con-
troversia1.5 In 1807, for example, in an effort to avoid war with 
Britain and France, President Thomas Jefferson imposed an em-
bargo on all export trade from the United. States to any foreign 
port.6 On May 1, 1985, declaring a national emergency, President 
Ronald Reagan imposed a trade embargo against Nicaragua and the 
Sandinista regime.7 Recently, in March 1993, the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee held hearings to consider imposing trade sanc-
tions against countries that violate international arms control agree-
ments.8 On August 25, 1993, the United States imposed a ban on 
selected missile technology sales to China and Pakistan.9 
More recent, but equally controversial, is the practice of using 
trade sanctions to advance the cause of human rights, as in the case 
of the threat to impose trade sanctions against China. One of the 
earliest and most hotly debated examples of a U.S. Congressional 
commitment to human rights backed with the threat of trade sanc-
tions is the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974.10 
This amendment denies MFN trading status to a Communist coun-
try that does not permit free emigration of its citizens. 11 Some U.S. 
trade laws enacted more recently, such as the Generalized System 
of Preferences,12 condition receipt of trade benefits from the United 
States upon assurances that the beneficiary country complies with 
internationally recognized worker rights. 
The third example, the U.S. ban on tuna imported from Mex-
ico, involves the latest, and arguably the most controversial, exam-
ple of employing trade sanctions to promote a foreign policy goal: 
5. For an excellent review of the history and success record of economic sanctions 
in the United States, see BARRY E. CARTER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: 
IMPROVING THE HAPHAZARD U.S. LEGAL REGIME (1988). 
6. See id. at 8. Jefferson's effort failed, however, as the War of 1812 demonstrated. 
7. Exec. Order No. 12,513,50 Fed. Reg. 18,629 (1985). 
8. u.S. Urged to Withdraw Trade Benefitsfrom Countries Promoting Weapons Trade, 
10 In1'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No.9, at 365 (Mar. 3, 1993). 
9. U.S., Citing Arms Transfer, Bars Some Sales of Advanced Technology to China, 
Pakistan, 10 In1'I Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 35, at 1444 (Sept. 1, 1993). 
10. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2431-2441 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Similarly, the Clinton 
administration conditioned renewal of China's MFN trade status upon improvement of its 
human rights record. See Amy Kaslow, President Urges Renewal of China's Top Trade 
Status, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 28, 1993, at 1,4. 
11. See Adlai E. Stevenson & Alton Frye, Trading with the Commllnists, FOREIGN 
AFF., Spring 1989, at 53. 
12. 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(7) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
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the protection of the global commons. The use of unilateral trade 
sanctions to promote environmental protection is the focus of this 
Article. 
It is not surprising that international trade measures have be-
come the mechanism of choice for responding t6 behavior by other 
countries that threatens national security, human rights, or the 
global environment. First, trade sanctions are conspicuous 'meas-
ures and, therefore, potentially carry great symbolic importance. 
Second, trade measures do not generally involve or threaten the use 
of armed force. 13 Moreover, it is undoubtedly easier to initiate and 
implement unilateral trade sanctions. than it is to commit and de-
ploy troops abroad. 14 
Given the advantages of trade sanctions as an international 
enforcement alternative, it is not surprising that some environmen-
talists have borrowed pages from the book of national security and 
human rights advocates and have embraced import bans and re-
strictions as the preferred method for forcing United States trading 
partners to adopt measures that protect the environment. Indeed, 
the use of trade measures to impose and enforce environmental 
standards is particularly compelling when the markets created by 
open international trade are in large part responsible for the envi-
ronmental damage. 15 
Although trade sanctions have an obvious and understandable 
appeal, many environmentalists have failed.to ask whether trade 
sanctions are effective in securing a better environment. Admit-
tedly, the symbolic role of trade sanctions, much touted in the 
human rights arena,16 should not be completely discounted when 
pursuing environmental goals. Symbolic value may constitute a 
necessary condition for the imposition of trade sanctions against a 
13. "Quarantines," like those imposed on Cuba by the United States during the 
Cuban missile crisis, are an exception to the generally peaceful nature of trade sanctions. 
14. Nonetheless, building a national or international consensus on the use of trade 
sanctions might present policymakers with a supremely delicate challenge. Witness the 
struggle between Congress and President Bush over China's continued MFN trade status 
under the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. See Ann S. Tyson, China Reacts to US Trade 
Decision, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 25, 1990, at 3; Senate Sustains President's Veto 
of Bill Conditioning MFN Status for China, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No.9, at 518 (Mar. 
25, 1992). 
15. For example, trade in toxic chemicals or in endangered species. 
16. See, e.g., CARTER, supra note 5, at 94. Although the Comprehensive Anti-Apart-
heid Act of 1986, 22 U.S.C. §§ 5001-5117 (1992), cut off U.S. exports of oil to South 
Africa, the latter could still purchase oil from other sources. See id. Nevertheless, "cutting 
off petroleum to South Africa had considerable symbolism." ld. 
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country with a less than exemplary environmental track record. 
Symbolism alone, however, ought not to provide a sufficient reason 
for imposing such sanctions without some measurable change in 
the offensive conduct of the target country. 
Beyond symbolism, trade sanctions must serve as an effective 
tool for achieving environmental ends in order to justify the poten-
tially crippling impact of trade barriers on the world economy. The 
efficiency of trade sanctions, therefore, ought to be decisionmak-
ers' initial focus and must ultimately be the bottom line. Otherwise, 
the combination of legitimate environmental concerns with strong 
trade protectionist pressures at home could lead to an undisciplined 
and discriminatory use of trade sanctions. Given the potential ad-
verse effects of such discriminatory use, trade sanctions imposed 
on environmental, or any other grounds, must be used in a very 
disciplined fashion. 
Part II of this Article introduces some basic concepts in inter-
national trade law and international environmental law. Part III 
explores environmentalists' concerns about free trade. Part IV ex-
amines various proposed measures to reform trade laws to serve 
environmental ends, and concludes with a discussion of the 
benefits of a multilateral approach to achieving environmental 
goals. 
II. OVERVIEW 
A. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: The 
International Trade "Constitution" 
The modern formulation of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade ("GATT") is the centerpiece of international trade pol-
icy.I7 GATT is both an international agreement and an international 
organization. Headquartered in Geneva, GATT is the primary in-
ternational trade agreement governing trade in goodsI8 for some 
17. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5-6, 55 
U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT]. 
18. At present, GATT covers only trade in goods. The recently completed Uruguay 
Round of negotiations focused on trade in services, rules on investment, and intellectual 
property protection. 
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111 member countries,19 including every leading industrial country 
except China and Russia. 
Although GATT was originally designed to be an interim 
treaty, and was not intended to be either the central world trade 
organization or the foundation agreement on international trade,2° 
it nevertheless performs both of these duties.21 Strangely enough, 
GATT has never come into full force, but instead applies provi-
sionally to the various contracting parties with varying levels of 
rigor.22 Every GATT contracting party-as GATT signatories are 
called-with the exception of Haiti ,23 has acceded to GATT 
through a "protocol of provisional application."24 
Despite GATT's unusual origin; both it and the trade phiJoso-
phy it embodies have weathered a series of protectionist storms 
over its forty-five-year history. GATT has entrenched itself reason-
ably well both as a permanent agreement and as an international 
trade organization.25 
GATT is premised on the economic principle of "liberal" 
trade.26 As one commentator has explained, 
[i]n a liberal economic system, government does not thwart 
private parties in their attempts to enter voluntary transactions, 
and taxes are stable, predictable, and nonprohibitive. The Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is liberal in this 
19. European Council Calls for Conclusion to GATT Talks by End of Year and New 
MTO, 10 Int'l Trade Rptr .. (BNA) No. 25, at 1035, 1036 (June 23, 1993). 
20. See Armin von Bogdandy, International Trade Law, in U.S. TRADE BARRIERS: 
A LEGAL ANALYSIS 74-76 (Eberhard Grabitz & Armin von Bogdandy eds. 1991); KEN-
NETH W. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 10-16 
(1970); JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 35-57 (1969) 
[hereinafter JACKSON II. 
21. GATT was designed to be an interim agreement until the national legislatures 
of the GATT contracting parties approved the International Trade Organization ("ITO") 
and the Havana Charter. But when a neo-isolationist U.S. Senate refused to approve U.S. 
membership in the organization, the gestating ITO and its Charter were stillborn. The 
contracting parties then pressed GATT into service to fill the legal and institutional vacuum 
and to perform the functions that the more complete ITO Charter, with its formal 
organizational structure, would have fulfilled. See RESTATEMENT (3D) FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, pt. II, Introductory Note at 263-65 (1987). 
22. See JACKSON I, supra note 20, at 59. 
23. See id. at 60. 
24. GATT, supra note 17,61 Stat. at A2051, 55 U.N.T.S. at 308. 
25. See GATT's Last Chance, ECONOMIST, June 1, 1991, at 65; A Lifeboat for Trade, 
ECONOMIST, Dec. 8, 1990, at 11. 
26. See John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Erwironmental Policies: Congru-
ence or Conflict, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1227, 1231 (1992) [hereinafter JACKSON II]. 
For a description of GATT's negotiating history, see JACKSON I, supra note 20, at 35-57. 
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sense .... Interventions [by governments] in liberal exchange 
across frontiers to make trade fair may be the political price of 
liberalism, but such interventions are themselves its antithesis.2' 
Liberal trade is desirable because, by exploiting the law of com-
parative advantage, it increases total world wealth in two important 
ways: (1) secure access to barrier-free international markets facili-
tates economies of scale; and (2) increased international competi-
tion leads to product and process innovation, further reducing 
manufacturing costs and expanding consumer choices.28 
GATT seeks to achieve its goal of liberal world trade primarily 
through three commitments contained in its first three Articles. 
These commitments, popularly referred to as the "three pillars" of 
GATT, include: (1) an unconditional MFN obligation that prohibits 
contracting parties from discriminating against or giving prefer-
ences to any other GATT contracting parties, regardless of whether 
the latter have made any trade concessions to the former; (2) bind-
ing negotiated tariff commitments on imports, coupled with the 
elimination of quotas on imports under Article XI; and (3) a na-
tional treatment obligation that requires contracting parties to treat 
imports the same as like domestic products insofar as taxes and 
other domestic regulations are concerned.29 
Generally speaking, any government regulation of, or interfer-
ence with, international trade that deviates from the liberal trade 
philosophy of GATT is disapproved of by the Agreement. 30 GATT 
does, however, permit government intervention to regulate or pro-
hibit the flow of goods across borders under limited circumstances. 
27. Martin Wolf: Why trade liberalization is a good idea, in THE URUGUAY ROUND, 
A HANDBOOK ON THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 14 (J. Michael Finger & 
Andrzej Olechowski eds. 1987). 
28. See Richard B. Stewart, International Trade and Environment: Lessons from the 
Federal Experience, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1329, 1330 (1992). 
29. See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Free International Trade and Protection of the 
Environment: Irreconcilable Conflict?, 86 AM. J. rnT'L L. 700, 704-10 (1992). 
30. In practice, of course, much of international trade in goods falls outside GATT 
disciplines, such as trade in textiles that is subject to export quotas under the Multifiber 
Arrangement, trade in agricultural products, trade in steel, and trade in automobiles from 
Japan which is subject to a voluntary restraint agreement. But these deviations from GATT 
represent a failure of political will on the part of GATT members to adhere to GATT 
disciplines rather than a failure of GATT per se. See RESTATEMENT (3D) FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES rplrs. nn.2-3 (1987); PAUL B. STEPHEN III ET 
AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 684 (1993). 
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In addition to authorizing the imposition of tariffs on imported 
goods,31 GATT permits three other noteworthy deviations from the 
liberal trade paradigm. 
First, a GATT contracting party facing a balance-of-payments 
shortfall may temporarily impose "quantitative restrictions," or 
quotas, on the volume of goods imported until the shortfall im-
proves.32 Second, domestic industries seriously injured by compet-
ing imports may receive "safeguard" relief from their home gov-
ernment,33 such as a temporary increase in tariffs or the imposition 
of quotas on competing imports.34 The third exception authorized 
by GATT under which a contracting party may restrict or prohibit 
imports, is in fact a set of general exceptions found in Article XX 
regarding public health and safety measures35 and the national se-
curity exception found in Article XXI.36 
31. GAIT, supra note 17, art. II, 61 Stat. at A15, 55 U.N.T.S. at 200. 
32. GAIT, supra note 17, art. XII, 61 Stat. at A34, 55 U.N.T.S. at 228. 
33. This is known in the United States as Section 201 escape clause relief. 19 U.S.C. 
§§ 2251-2254 (1992). 
34. Id. See GAIT, supra note 17, art. XIX, 61 Stat. pts. 5-6, 55 U.N.T.S. at 258. 
35. GAIT, supra note 17, art. XX, 61 Stat. at A60-61, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262; id. art. 
XXI, 61 Stat. at A63, 55 U.N.T.S. at 266. 
36. Article XXI of GATT provides: 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed 
(a) to require any contracting party to furnish any information the disclosure 
of which it considers contrary to its essential security interests; or 
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers 
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests 
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are 
derived; 
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to 
such traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly 
for the purpose of supplying a military establishment; 
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; or 
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of 
its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. 
GAIT, supra note 17, art. XXI, 61 Stat. at A63, 55 U.N.T.S. at 266. 
The United States invoked Article XXI to impose a trade embargo against Nicaragua 
on May 1, 1985. See President Reagan Imposes Trade Embargo, Other Economic Sanc-
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To fully understand the scope of the general exceptions of 
Article XX, they must be read against the backdrop of Section Four 
of Article III: the national treatment obligation. This obligation 
directs contracting parties not to discriminate against imports in 
favor of like domestic products.37 To the extent that the importing 
country's health and safety regulations purport to have an extrater-
ritorial effect-for example, by targeting foreign production proc-
esses rather than the product itself38-the regulations also violate 
Section Four of Article III.39 
Article XX permits contracting parties to restrict imports on a 
number of specific grounds. Of its enumerated exceptions, the 
public health and safety exception, the customs enforcement ex-
ception, and the exception for conservation of natural resources 
touch most directly on the enforcement of environmental meas-
ures.40 
tions on Nicaragua, 2 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 637 (May 8, 1985) (discussing 
Executive Order No. 12,513, supra note 7). Nicaragua responded by filing an unsuccessful 
complaint with the GATT Secretariat challenging the embargo. See U.S. Embargo 011 
Nicaragua Did Not Violate Obligations Under GAIT, Despite Panel Rilles, 3 Int'l Trade 
Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 1368 (May 12, 1986). 
37. GATT's Article III provides, in pertinent part: 
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the 
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less 
favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of 
all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for 
sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. 
GATT, supra note 17, art. III, § 2, 61 Stat. at A18, 55 U.N.T.S. at 210. 
38. See Schoenbaum, supra note 29, at 702. GATT places virtually no obstacle 
whatsoever, however, in the path of a country that wants to protect its environment by 
regulating domestic industries that use polluting production processes and methods. /d. 
When an importing country's domestic health and safety standards discriminate against 
imported goods and in favor of domestic products, the exporting country can also complain 
under Article XXIII that an agreed-upon trade concession has been nullified or impaired. 
39. GATT, supra note 17, art. IV, 'lI 4,61 Stat. at A19, 55 U.N.T.S. at 210. 
40. These three exceptions provide as follows: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction 
on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent 
the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
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A health or safety import measure must satisfy three require-
ments to be permissible under Article XX. First, it must be "nec-
essary" to the extent that no less trade restrictive alternative is 
available. Second, it must not "arbitrarily" or "unjustifiably" dis-
criminate between countries (in other words, it must be consistent 
~ith the MFN obligation). Finally, it must not be a disguised 
restriction on international trade.41 
Because the terms "necessary," "arbitrarily," and "unjusti-
fiably" are vague, the health and safety exception is a potentially 
rich source of formidable non-tariff barriers to trade. For example, 
it is unclear whether the exception for human life and health covers 
persons within the importing country only, or whether it extends 
to human health and life worldwide. Given such vagueness, there 
is a significant possibility that economically powerful countries 
will exploit the exception in order to extend their own brand of 
environmental protection to weaker trading nations. Developing 
countries consider industrialized countries' demands that they 
adopt and enforce strict environmental standards as "eco-imperial-
ism."42 In practice, however, the Article XX exceptions have been 
used sparingly.43 
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not 
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including those relating to 
customs enforcement . . . the protection of patents, trade marks and copy-
rights, and the prevention of deceptive practices; 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such 
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption . . . . 
GAIT, supra note 17, art. XX, 61 Stat. at A60-61, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262. For an overview 
of GAIT provisions dealing with environmental issues, see Robert F. Housman & 
Durwood J. Zaelke, Trade, Environment, and Sustainable Development: A Primer, 15 
HASTINGS INT'L & COMPo L. REv. 535 (1992). 
41. See Schoenbaum, supra note 29, at 713. 
42. See JACKSON 11, supra note 26, at 1241. The developing and industrialized 
countries so far appear to be talking past each other in ad&essing environmental priorities. 
Developing countries tend to focus on providing water and housing and reducing poverty, 
while industrialized countries emphasize such problems as ozone depletion, biodiversity, 
deforestation, and desertification. See Robert M. Press, A Year After Rio, North and South 
Still Debate Priorities, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 19, 1993, at 3. 
43. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT: 
CONFLICTS AND OPPORTUNITIES 81-90 (1992) [hereinafter OTA REpORT]. See also JACK-
SON II, supra note 26, at 1239-45, for a more in-depth discussion of these three Article 
XX exceptions, of the role Article XX plays as an environmental regulatory tool, and of 
attempts to make Article XX a major loophole to GATT's liberal trade philosophy. 
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B. The International Environmental "Constitutions": 
The Stockholm and Rio Declarations 
In 1991, the U.S. International Trade Commission reported 
170 multilateral and bilateral agreements for the protection of the 
environment and wildlife, most of them dating from the 1970s.44 
From this host of treaties and conventions, no single document 
emerges as the international environmental law "constitution" 
analogous to GATT in the trade field.45 International environmental 
law thus resembles a patchwork quilt.46 Nevertheless, two closely 
related documents set forth the basic principles of international 
environmental law and policy and are recognized as the center-
pieces of the field. These documents are the 1972 Stockholm Dec-
laration on the Human Environment47 and the 1992 Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development. 48 
The Stockholm and Rio Declarations respectively contain 
twenty-six and twenty-seven guiding principles for protecting the 
global environment, principles to which signatory states have com-
mitted themselves. Neither declaration calls for the extreme ver-
sion of environmental protection advocated by what one commen-
tator has called the BANANA camp of environmentalists-"build 
absolutely nothing anywhere near anyone."49 The Stockholm and 
Rio Declarations do not champion the cause of the environment 
44. u.s. INTERNATIONAL 'TRADE COMMISSION, PUB. 2351, INTERNATIONAL AGREE-
MENTS TO PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND WILDLIFE (Jan. 1991). 
45. Edith Brown Weiss, Environment and Trade as Partners in SlIstainable Devel-
opment: A Commentary, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 728, 729 (1992). Several authors have 
proposed that such a "constitution" be established. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, GATTing the 
Greens, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.lDec. 1993, at 32,36. 
46. See Jeffrey M. Lang, Trade and the Environment, in CONFRONTING TRADE AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS: PROSPECTS AND PRACTICAL ApPROACHES 1, 8 (Am. Bar 
Ass'n Section on Int'l L. & Practice Conference papers, 1993). 
47. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, June 
16,1972, U.N. Doc. AlConf. 48114 (1972) (adopted by the U.N. Conference on the Human 
Environment at Stockholm), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972) [hereinafter Stockholm 
Declaration]. ' 
48. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 13, 1992, U.N. Doc. 
AlConf. 151/5 (1992) (adopted by the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development 
at Rio de Janeiro), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 876 (1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration]. 
49. "BANANA" is an acronym that describes the most extreme environmentalist 
position. Another popular acronym is "NIMBY" ("not in my back yard"), which describes 
a far more limited and far less altruistic environmental position. See Craig Van Grasstek, 
The Political Economy of Trade and the Environment in the United States Senate, in 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 227, 233 (Patrick Lowed. 1992). 
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aber alles,50 but rather take a balanced approach to the issue of 
trade and the environment. Indeed, a distillation of the largely 
overlapping principles of the Declarations yields two potentially 
conflicting concepts: national sovereignty and international coop-
eration. Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration exemplifies this 
sovereignty/cooperation dichotomy: 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign 
right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own 
environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that 
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause dam-
age to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction.51 
Principles 11 and 13 of the Rio Declaration further reflect the 
persistence of sovereignty as a driving force of international envi-
ronmental agreements. These two Principles direct states to enact 
national legislation to deal with issues of environmental damage, 
liability, and compensation for victims of pollution.52 Relying ex-
clusively on national initiatives to address domestic environmental 
issues, however, will not likely produce a comprehensive and co-
ordinated legal regime that adequately advances the goal of pro-
tecting the global environment. Recognizing this, the Stockholm 
and Rio Declarations call upon states to cooperate with one another 
in developing international conventions to deal with issues of trans-
boundary pollution. 53 
50. See Jeffrey D. Kovar, A Short Guide to the Rio Declaration, 4 COLO. J. nn'L 
ENVTL. L. & POL'y 119 (1993). 
51. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 47, Principle 21, U.N. Doc. AlConf. 48114 
at 7, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. at 1420. Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration tracks Principle 
21's language verbatim, merely adding "and developmental" to the phrase "pursuant to 
their own environmental policies!' Rio Declaration, supra note 48, Principle 2, U.N. Doc. 
A/Conf. 151/5 at 2, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 877. 
52. Principle 11 of the Rio Declaration provides in part that "States shall enact 
effective environmental legislation." Rio Declaration, supra note 48, Principle 11, U.N. 
Doc. AlConf. 15115 at 4, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 878. In this same regard, Principle 13 
states in part that "States shall develop national law regarding liability and compensation 
for the victims of pollution and other environmental damage." ld. Principle 13, U.N. Doc. 
A/Conf. 151/5 at 4, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 878. 
53. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 47, Principles 22, 24, U.N. Doc. AlConf. 
48114 at 7, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. at 1420; Rio Declaration, supra note 48, Principles 
13-14, U.N. Doc. AlConf. 15115 at 4, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 878. To further this 
cooperative effort, signatory states also commit to sharing scientific information. Stock-
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In their attempts to preserve national sovereignty while en-
couraging international cooperation, the Stockholm and Rio Dec-
larations also struggle to accommodate international environmental 
protection and international trade. Neither Declaration is hostile to 
international trade. On the contrary, both documents exhibit a keen 
sensitivity to the importance of an open trading system and an 
awareness that environmental regulations may easily be employed 
as pretexts for thinly disguised protectionism. Although the Stock-
holm Declaration does not directly address the impact of environ-
mental regulation on the growth of international trade, the Rio 
Declaration provides a broad framework for harmonizing environ-
mental and trade concerns. In the event that the two concerns 
conflict, the Rio Declaration gives trade issues primacy over envi-
ronmental concerns. 
Principles 11, 12, and 16 of the Rio Declaration specifically 
warn against pursuing aggressive environmental policies that could 
have a potentially adverse impact on international trade. First, 
Principle 11 states that "[environmental] [s]tandards applied by 
some countries may be inappropriate and of unwarranted economic 
and social cost to other countries, in particular developing coun-
tries."54 In addition, Principle 11 mildly admonishes industrialized 
countries not to demand that developing countries harmonize envi-
ronmental standards without considering the economic and social 
costs to developing countries. 
Principle 12 in turn addresses the crux of the environment! 
trade debate-namely, environmental measures that serve to dis-
guise protectionist trade policies. The declaration weighs in on the 
side of trade: 
States should cooperate to promote a supportive and open 
international economic system that would lead to economic 
growth and sustainable development in all countries, to better 
address the problems of environmental degradation. Trade pol-
icy measures for environmental purposes should not constitute 
holm Declaration, supra note 47, Principle 20, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 48114 at 6, reprinted 
in 11 I.L.M. at 1420; Rio Declaration, supra note 48, Principle 9, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 15115 
at 3, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 877. For a criticism of state sovereignty as a political 
obstacle to further progress in the development of international environmental law, see 
Mark Allan Gray, The United Nations Environment Programme: An Assessment, 20 ENVTL. 
L. 291, 315 (1989). 
54. Rio Declaration, supra note 48, Principle 11, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 151/5 at 4, 
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 878. 
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a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a dis-
guised restriction on international trade. Unilateral actions to 
deal with environmental challenges outside the jurisdiction of 
the importing country should be avoided. Environmental meas-
ures addressing transboundary or global environmental prob-
lems should, as far as possible, be based on an international 
consensus. 55 
197 
Principle 12 conveys both a substantive and procedural message. 
On the substantive level, when trade measures are used in the name 
of environmental protection, the means and the ends should be 
closely and causally linked. On the procedural level, unilateralism 
and extraterritorial regulation are unacceptable, while multilateral 
approaches and consensus are strongly encouraged. 
Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration expands upon the direc-
tives of Principles 11 and 12. Principle 16 counsels against the 
adoption of environmental policies that might distort world trade 
patterns: 
National authorities should endeavour to promote the interna-
tionalization of environmental costs and the use of economic 
instruments, taking into account the approach that the polluter 
should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard 
to the public interest and without distorting international trade 
and investment.56 
Principle 16's "polluter pays principle" is tempered by Principle 
11 's warning against the imposition by developed countries of 
strict environmental standards on developing countries, and by 
Principle 12's rejection of unilateralism and protectionism in the 
guise of environmentalism. 
If we accept the Stockholm and Rio Declarations as reason-
ably accurate reflections of world opinion on the interrelationship 
of trade and the environment,57 then it would seem there is general 
agreement for the proposition that economic growth should not be 
stifled or the open world trading system destroyed in the guise of 
55. ld. Principle 12, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 151/5 at 4, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 878 
(emphasis added). 
56. ld. Principle 16, U.N. Doc. AlConf. 15115 at 5, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 879. 
57. The vote on the Stockholm Declaration was 103 countries for, 0 against, and 
12 abstaining. See BURNS H. WESTON ET AL., BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND WORLD ORDER 943 (2d ed. 1990). More than 175 countries attending the Rio 
Conference adopted the Rio Declaration by consensus. Kovar, supra note 50, at 119. 
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environmental protection. Although GATT predates the emergence 
of a significant international environmental movement among 
states by at least two decades,58 both the Stockholm Declaration 
and the Rio Declaration in large part support the liberal trade 
philosophy of GATT.59 Both stress the importance of balancing 
trade, economic growth, and environmental concerns. Taking a 
similar balancing approach, GATT emphasizes the importance of 
open, unrestricted trade, but recognizes that importing countries 
may have legitimate health and safety reasons for restricting or 
banning certain imports. 
Even though GATT and its environmental counterparts, the 
Stockholm and Rio Declarations, are not in conflict, GATT and 
free trade policy in general have nevertheless become scapegoats 
for many environmentalists. The next section will address why this 
is so. 
m. WHY ENVIRONMENTALISTS HAVE PILLORIED GATT AND 
FREE TRADE 
A. The Tension Between International Trade Law and 
International Environmental Law 
The fit between international trade law and international envi-
ronmentallaw has always been rough at best, with trade and envi-
ronmental issues proceeding on separate, but parallel, tracks. As 
levels of world trade and investment have rapidly risen in the 
post-war era, so too has the level of environmental degradation. 
Many commentators view this development with concern, others 
with outright alarm. 60 
Many environmentalists are alarmed by the poor fit between 
trade and environment. A few environmental extremists have even 
58. See supra text accompanying note 44. 
59. See supra note 17 (noting that GATT entered into for~e in 1947). 
60. See, e.g., Hamilton Southworth TIl, Comment, GATT and the Environment-
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Trade and the Environment, GATT Doc. 1529 
(Feb. 13, 1992),32 VA. J.lNT'L L. 997 (1992). In its 1992 report, the Congressional Office 
of Technology Assessment observed in understated matter-of-factness that "[t]he potential 
for conflict between environmental concerns and international trade is increasing," OTA 
REpORT, supra note 43, at 3. Other observers consider trade liberalization and environ-
mental degradation to be in a cause and effect relationship. See Steve Charnovitz, 
Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in GATT Article XX, 25 J. WORLD TRADE 37, 
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demanded an end to free trade, arguing that with free trade comes 
economic growth, and with economic growth comes pollution.61 
Moreover, because market mechanisms do not always take environ-
mental costs fully into account, these critics argue that a legal 
climate that promotes unregulated free trade could contribute to the 
unrestricted, trans border movement of hazardous products and 
waste.62 Environmentalists also fear that countries with compara-
tively more stringent environmental standards will relax those 
standards (an environmental version of "the race to the bottom"63), 
to allow domestic producers to compete with producers operating 
in countries with less demanding environmental standards,64 
thereby stanching the flow of capital, jobs, and wages abroad.65 
The need for greater integration of trade and environmental 
policies is undeniable.66 Trade and environmental policies need not 
be mutually exclusive. As one economist has observed, "[m]ost 
environmental policies are not in conflict with basic GATT rules."67 
Although environmentalists have many grievances with GATT,68 
their ire is misdirected. If the real concern is that liberal trade may 
reduce worldwide environmental standards to the lowest common 
denominator, then the problem lies either in the market's failure 
to reflect environmental costs in prices or in government interfer-
ence with the market through subsidization of polluting indus-
39-43 (1991); John Hunt, Free Traders Heading for Clash with Greens, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 
5, 1991, at 6. 
61. See Schoenbaum, supra note 29, at 700; Don't Green GATT, ECONOMIST, Dec. 
26, 1992, at 15. 
62. U.S. INTERNATIONAL 'TRADE COMMISSION, PUB. 2554, 'THE YEAR IN 'TRADE: 
OPERATION OF THE 'TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 1991, at 14 (Aug. 1992) [hereinafter 
THE YEAR IN 'TRADE 1991]. 
63. See Weiss, supra note 45, at 729; see also Frederick M. Abbott, Trade and 
Democratic Values, 1 MINN. J. GLOBAL 'TRADE 9, 31 (1992). 
64. See Schoenbaum, supra note 29, at 701. 
65. THE YEAR IN TRADE 1991, supra note 62, at 14. 
66. The tuna/dolphin controversy is just one example. See infra note 78. 
67. Piritta Sorsa, GATT and ElWironment: Basic Issues and Some Developing 
Country Concerns, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 325, 327 (patrick 
Lowed. 1992). 
68. The following are the grievances environmentalists have with GATT: (1) GATT 
limits national sovereignty and thus restricts the environmental measures a country may 
wish to use; (2) GATT does not permit production-based grounds as a reason for excluding 
an imported product; (3) GATT does not permit the imposition of countervailing duties 
on imports from countries with lax environmental laws; (4) GATT encourages harmoniza-
tion of product standards, which leads to a lowering of standards; (5) GATT prevents 
export bans on products except in very narrowly defined circumstances; (6) GATT prevents 
the unilateral, extraterritorial imposition of environmental standards by one country upon 
another; (7) GATT's most-favored-nation obligation prohibits countries from distinguish-
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tries.69 Moreover, economic studies demonstrate that tough environ-
mental standards by themselves do not cause companies to relocate 
abroad.70 Other factors, such as labor costs, transportation infra-
structure, market access, and political stability figure more promi-
nently in the location/relocation decision.71 Hence, a rational gov-
ernment would not simply lower environmental standards to retain 
local industry as the environmentalists fear. 
Nevertheless, the market model of favoring government non-
interference with the free flow of goods-the model that shaped 
GATT-has not found a comfortable niche in international envi-
ronmental law. Market economics leaves the problem of limiting 
externalities (e.g., pollution) to the market, not to governments. A 
market approach to environmental problems has not proven entirely 
effective.72 For example, one potential approach to mitigating pol-
lution would be to adopt a "polluter pays principle."73 That is, those 
who pollute should bear the cost of pollution or pass it on to the 
consumer. But polluters are unlikely to abate their pollution vol-
untarily in the absence of a government requirement, because pol-
luters cannot rely on their competitors to do so voluntarily. Inter-
national environmental problems require a model that invites and 
arguably requires government regulation of the market.14 Thus en-
vironmentalists are justified in challenging the free traders' basic 
assumption that markets are capable of effectively protecting the 
environment. 75 
ing between countries in treatment on the basis of different environmental policies; 
(8) GAlT's dispute settlement mechanisms are secretive and do not permit environmen-
talists to intervene in the decisionmaking process. A Catalogue of Grievances, ECONOMIST, 
Feb. 27, 1993, at 26. 
69. See Sorsa, supra note 67, at 325 n.3. 
70. See The Greening of Protectionism, ECONOMIST, Feb. 27, 1993, at 26 [hereinaf-
ter Greening]. 
71. See id. 
72. Growing problems resulting from international trade in endangered species and 
hazardous substances are examples of market failures requiring government regulation. See 
infra note 96. 
73. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
74. See JACKSON II, supra note 26, at 1231-32. 
75. See Herman E. Daly, From Adjustment to Sustainable Development: The Obsta-
cle of Free Trade, 15 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMPo L.J. 33, 34-42 (1992); Patti A. Goldman, 
Resolving the Trade and Environment Debate: In Search of A Neutral Forum and Nelltral 
Principles, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1279, 1290-92 (1992); NAFTA Implementing 
Legislation Uncertain But Wilson Says No Plan to Delay Passage, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. 
(BNA) No. 10, at 415-16 (Mar. 10, 1993). 
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B. The Catalysts for Environmentalists' Recent Disenchantment 
with GATT and Free Trade 
A series of GATT Panel reports dealing with import bans 
ostensibly effected for environmental and health reasons76 has con-
tributed to environmentalists' disenchantment with GATT and with 
free trade in general.77 Two GATT Panel reports in the 1980s in-
volved the interpretation of Articles XX(g) (resource conservation 
measures) and XI (the general prohibition against quotas). 
In a 1982 case, Canada challenged a U.S. ban on tuna im-
ported from Canada.78 Canada argued that the ban was imposed in 
retaliation for its seizure of American-flagged fishing vessels 
caught illegally harvesting .tuna off of Canada's west coast. The 
United States defended its action as falling within Article XX(g)'s 
exception for conservation of fish stocks. The GATT Panel con-
cluded that the United States could not use Article XX(g) to defend 
the ban since they had not taken any parallel measures at home to 
limit the tuna catch of the U.S. domestic fleet. Therefore, the ban 
on Canadian tuna imports constituted an impermissible quantitative 
restriction in 'violation of Article XI. 79 
A 1988 GATT Panel decision also dealt with the interpretation 
of Article XX(g).80 In that case, the United States protested a 
blanket export ban imposed by Canada on unprocessed herring and 
salmon. Because Canada had not placed any domestic restrictions 
on Canadian consumption of herring and salmon, the GATT Panel 
held that the Canadian export ban was not "primarily aimed" at 
76. See Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Environment and Trade Measures After the Tuna/Dol-
phin Decision, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1221 (1992); Porter, supra note 4, at 91. For a 
review of U.S. legislation and recent congressional proposals that would authorize the 
imposition of unilateral trade sanctions on environmental grounds, see Matthew Hunter 
Hurlock, Note, The GATT, U.S. Law and the Environment: A Proposal to Amend the GATT 
in Light of the Tuna/Dolphin Decision, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 2098, 2113-17 (1992). For a 
discussion of the GATT dispute settlement process, see Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, 
Settling Disputes in the GATT: The Past, Present, and Future, 24 INT'L LAW. 519 (1990). 
77. For a discussion of environmental concerns raised during the NAFfA negotia-
tions and how those issues were resolved, see Richard B. Stewart, The NAFTA: Trade, 
Competition, Environmental Protection, 27 INT'L LAW. 751 (1993); Raymond B. Lud-
wiszewski. "Green" Language in the NAFTA: Reconciling Free Trade and Environmental 
Protection, 27 INT'L LAW. 691 (1993). 
78. United States-Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada, 
Report of the Panel, GAIT Doc. Ll5198 (Feb. 22, 1982), reprinted in BASIC INSTRUMENTS 
AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 29th Supp., at 91 (1983). 
79.Id. . 
80. Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, Report of the 
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conservation.81 The Panel rejected Canada's argument that the so-
called "quality" exception under Article XI:2(b) justified the ban 
since Canada's export ban was across-the-board and did not permit 
shipments that would comply with the standards.82 
A third GATT Panel report involved a Canadian and European 
Community ("EC") complaint against a U.S. surcharge imposed on 
imported oil and chemicals to fund the Superfund environmental 
cleanup law.83 Because the additional taxes on imported oil were 
higher than comparable taxes on domestically produced oil, Can-
ada argued that the Superfund tax violated GATT's national treat-
ment obligation84 and that the imposition of the tax constituted a 
prima facie case of GATT nullification and impairment under Ar-
ticle XXIII. The GATT Panel accepted Canada's position with 
regard to the tax on imported oil but agreed with the United States 
that the tax on nonpetroleum chemical imports constituted a legiti-
mate border-tax adjustment permitted under Article II:2(a).8s 
Panel, GATT Doc. Ll6268 (Mar. 22, 1988), reprinted -in BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND 
SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 35th Supp., at 98 (1988). 
81. Id. at 115. 
82. In the aftermath of the GATT Panel report, Canada removed the export restric-
tions but replaced them with regulations requiring herring and salmon caught in Canadian 
waters to be landed in Canada before export. The United States brought a complaint under 
the Chapter 18 dispute resolution procedures of the Canada-United States Free Trade 
Agreement ("CUSFTA"). Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, 
reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988). The United States complained that although the new 
regulations were not a direct export ban, they had that ultimate effect due to the additional 
time and expense incurred in off-loading and processing the fish in Canada before export. 
The panel concluded that the Canadian regulations were not primarily aimed at conserva-
tion, were not exempted under Article XX(g), and thus constituted an impermissible 
quantitative restriction in violation of GATT Article XI, which CUSFTA incorporates 
through its Article 407. In the Matter of Canada's Landing Reqllirement for Pacific Coast 
Salmon and Herring, 1989 WL 250302 (U.S. Can. F.T.A. Binat. Panel Oct. 16, 1989). For 
a discussion of this case, see Ted L. McDorman, International Trade Law Meets Interna-
tional Fisheries Law: The Canada-U.S. Salmon and Herring Displlte, J. INT'L ARB., Dec. 
1990, at 107. 
83. United States Taxes on Petrolellm and Certain Imported SlIbstances, Report of 
the Panel, GATT Doc. L16175 (June 17, 1987), reprinted in BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND 
SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 34th Supp., at 136 (1987). 
84. Article ill prohibits the imposition of taxes that discriminate against imports in 
favor of like domestic products. It provides, in pertinent part: 
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the 
territory of any other contracting party shall not be SUbject, directly or 
indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of 
those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products .... 
GATT, sllpra note 17, art. ill, 'lI 2, 61 Stat. at 18, 55 U.N.T.S. at 204. 
85. Article II:2(a) of GATT provides: 
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The most recent and most notorious GATT Panel decision 
involving environmental trade measures dealt with the U.S. ban on 
tuna imported from Mexico.86 The United States imposed an import 
ban on tuna under provisions of the Marine Mammal Protection 
Act,87 a statute limiting the number of dolphins that may be killed 
while catching tuna using the purse-seine method. The United 
States justified its ban as necessary to protect animal life and to 
conserve exhaustible natural resources and therefore permissible 
under Article XX(b) and (g). Mexico argued that the ban violated 
the national treatment obligation of Article III and was also an 
illegal quantitative restriction in violation of Article XL 88 
The Panel held that the only permissible regulations under 
Article III are those that (1) regulate the imported product as a 
whole and not according to the production process used to manu-
facture the product, and (2) do not discriminate against the im-
ported product in favor of the domestic product. The U.S. regula-
tions failed to pass muster under either the first or second prong 
of this test. 
The GATT Panel found that the United States had violated the 
national treatment obligation since the ban did not cover tuna 
products per se but rather the process by which tuna were caught.89 
The GATT Panel further found that the U.S. method for calculating 
the number of allowable foreign dolphin kills violated Article Ill's 
national treatment obligation since it discriminated against the 
Mexican fleet. Because the figure for foreign dolphin catches was 
Nothing in this Article shall prevent any contracting party from imposing at 
any time on the importation of any product: 
(a) a charge equivalent to an internal tax imposed consistently with the 
provisions of paragraph 2 of Article III in respect of the like domestic product 
or in respect of an article from which the imported product has been 
manufactured or produced in whole or in part. 
GATT, supra note 17, art. II, 'lI 2(a), 61 Stat. at 15, 55 U.N.T.S. at 202. 
86. United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Report of the Panel, GATT Doc. 
DS211R, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991) [hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report]. For 
an analysis of the GATT Panel report in the tuna/dolphin dispute~ see Jeffrey L. Dunoff, 
Reconciling International Trade with Preservation of the Glohql Commons: Can We 
Prosper and Protect? 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1407, 1409-21 (1992). 
87. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421(a) (1988). 
88. Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 86, at 'lI'lI 3.10, 3.16, reprinted in 30 
I.L.M. at 1602-03. 
89. Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 86, at'll 5.14, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. at 
1618. 
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based on the actual number killed by the U.S. fleet, the Mexican 
fleet, unlike the American fleet, never knew in advance what their 
quota was to be.90 
Although the Panel concluded that the Article XX(b) and (g) 
exceptions do not expressly prohibit extraterritorial jurisdiction 
(the Mexican fishing did not occur in U.S. waters), they also noted 
that if the U.S. interpretation were accepted, then any country 
could unilaterally impose on foreign nations its own health and 
safety measures. Under the United States' interpretation of Article 
XX, contracting parties would be unable to "deviate [from these 
unilaterally imposed measures] without jeopardizing their rights 
under the General Agreement."91 The Panel found this result unac-
ceptable. The Panel suggested that the United States should have 
attempted to negotiate an international cooperative agreement with 
Mexico in the spirit of GATT multilateralism and not have pro-
ceeded to take unilateral action against tuna imports from Mex-
ico.92 
Do GATT and its free trade progeny really threaten the envi-
ronment? Can existing international trade legal regimes accommo-
date environmental issues? The next portion of this Article explores 
these questions. 
IV. ACHIEVING ENVIRONMENTAL GOALS WHILE AVOIDING 
PROTECTIONISM 
A. Proposed Measures to Reform GATT 
GATT does not give an importing country carte blanche to 
restrict trade for environmental reasons because such freedom 
would seriously compromise its goal of liberal trade promotion. 
Nevertheless, GATT does not rule out all possible responses to 
environmental concern. Two GATT-legal responses do exist: 
(1) the health and safety exception of Article XX(b), and (2) the 
natural resources conservation exception of Article XX(g). Dis-
satisfied with what they perceive to be too limited a range of 
responses to environmental issues, critics of GATT have proposed 
90. [d. 'lI 3.22, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. at 1604. 
91. [d. 'lI 5.27, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. at 1620. 
92.1d. 'lI 5.28, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. at 1620. 
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a variety of amendments to both GATT and U.S. trade laws. A 
number of bills and resolutions introduced in Congress attempt to 
reform GATT to give environmental issues greater weight in the 
context of international trade.93 The desirability of any of these 
proposals from a trade-promotion standpoint is highly questionable 
since most come with a fairly high protectionist price tag.94 Whether 
any of the proposals would be effective in achieving environmental 
goals is equally open to question. This Part addresses these issues 
in the context of ten specific proposals to reform GATT. 
1. Amend Article XX or Adopt a GAIT Waiver to Except Trade 
Measures Taken on Environmental Grounds 
The best alternative, both because it is multilateral and be-
cause it would be implemented within the existing framework, 
would be to amend GATT to permit environmentally based trade 
measures. Specifically, the contracting parties could either amend 
Article XX or could seek a GATT waiver. 
The major advantage to amending Article XX by adding an 
explicit exception for environmental measures is that any such 
amendment would necessarily be the product of a multilateral con-
sensus on the appropriate response to environmental negligence. A 
multilateral approach would "also minimize the threat of thinly 
disguised protectionist restrictions masquerading as environmental 
measures. An Article XX amendment could be extended to cover 
both products and production processes that are environmentally 
harmful. 
The problems with this proposal, however, are at least twofold. 
First, amending GATT is extremely difficult: amendments to Arti-
cle I (the MFN obligation) and Article II (tariff bindings) require 
unanimous approval of the contracting parties, and amendments 
can only be applied to those contracting parties that have accepted 
them.95 Securing unanimous consent on a subject as contentious as 
environmental standards that also permitted deviations from the 
93. See OTA REPORT, supra note 43, at 91-92; see also Hurlock, supra note 76, at 
2113-17. Examples of pending bills are S. 979, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (to require 
EPA administrator to establish environmental export program) and S. Res. 60, 103d Cong., 
1st Sess. (1993) (to reopen GATT negotiations to address environmental concerns). 
94. See infra notes 141, 143 and accompanying text. 
95. GATT, supra note 17, art. XXX, 61 Stat. at 74, 55 U.N.T.S. at 282. For a 
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MFN principle expressed in the preface to Article XX would be 
virtually impossible. 
A second problem with amending Article XX involves the 
thorny issue of establishing substantive standards. For example, if 
imports are to be excluded or taxed according to the processes by 
which they were produced, which country's standards should be 
applied? The best alternative, internationally agreed upon stand-
ards, has proven to be nettlesome in the past, even among close 
trading partners.96 The U.S.-E.C. dispute over sanitary standards for 
beef and pork is one recent example.97 If the domestic standards of 
the importing country are applied instead, a serious question of the 
extraterritorial application of the importing country's environ-
mental regulations is raised. Unless pollution is transboundary,98 by 
what authority can one country dictate to another the environ-
mental standards it should adopt?99 
Considering the significant procedural hurdles attendant to the 
discussion of a proposed amendment to Article XX that would include trade measures 
based on environmental grounds, see Hurlock, supra note 76. 
96. Conventions where nations have agreed to total bans on trade in certain items 
(such as the Basel Convention on hazardous and toxic waste and CITES on endangered 
species) or where nations agree to discontinue using a certain product (e.g., the Montreal 
Protocol on CFCs) arguably have the best chance of success, if they are coupled with solid 
evidence from the scientific community regarding the dangers and risks of no action. Basel 
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their 
Disposal, Mar. 27, 1989, U.N. Doc. UNEPIIG. 8013, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657 (1989) 
[hereinafter Basel Convention]; Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 (entered into 
force July 1, 1975) [hereinafter CITES]; Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete 
the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1550 (entered into force Jan. 1, 
1989) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]. 
97. E.C. Set to Block Imports of Most U.S. Pork, Claims Veterinary Standards Not 
Being Met, 7 Int'l Trade Rep (BNA) No. 42, at 1610 (1990); See Werner P. Meng, The 
Hormone Conflict Between the EEC and the United States Within the Context of GATT, 
11 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 818 (1990). 
98. See RESTATEMENT (3D) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES, § 601 (1987). 
99. The response to this rhetorical question is analogous to the situation where one 
or more countries challenge another's human rights record. Countries owe minimum 
human rights guarantees to all other states. See id .. § 701 cmt. c. Similarly, countries 
should honor their obligations to uphold internationally recognized minimum environ-
mental standards. The difference in the human rights arena, however, is that violations are 
typically challenged under the authority of an international convention or a unanimous 
declaration of the United Nations General Assembly, not under the national law of the 
challenging state. In addition, the international law of human rights, unlike international 
environmental law outside the area of transboundary pollution or pollution of the global 
commons, has developed sufficiently so that even when it is not treaty based, it neverthe-
less in many instances has the status of customary international law. Compare id. § 702 
(listing genocide, slavery, murder, torture, arbitrary detention, and systematic racial 
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GATT amendment process, particularly the unanimity requirement, 
a procedural alternative would be to adopt a GATT waiver that 
requires a super majority of two-thirds of those voting and one-half 
of the total membership.loo Those parties approving the waiver 
would exempt one another from adhering to GATT in connection 
with international environmental conventions-to which they are 
also parties-that regulate production processes for environmental 
reasons. Because such conventions-the Basel Convention or the 
Montreal Protocol, for example-enjoy wide acceptance among 
GATT contracting parties, securing a waiver is feasible. lol A waiver 
would be superfluous, however, in those cases where the provisions 
of the environmental convention itself already permit specific trade 
measures to be taken under the terms of the convention. I02 Standing 
alone, trade measures taken by an importing country that are di-
rected against an exporting country's production processes might 
violate GATT, in the absence of a GATT waiver. lo3 But trade meas-
ures taken pursuant to an international environmental convention 
that post-dates GATT arguably would not be unlawful under GATT 
since the customary international law of treaty interpretation dic-
tates that in the event of an inconsistency between an earlier and 
a later treaty, the latter controls.lo4 This assumes, of course, that 
discrimination as violations of the customary international law of human rights) with id. 
§ 601 (concerning the customary international law of the environment, where the Restate-
ment provides that a state "is obligated to take such measures as may be necessary, to the 
extent practicable under the circumstances," not to engage in injurious transboundary 
pollution). 
100. GAIT, supra note 17, art. Xxv, 'lI 5,61 Stat. at 68-69, 55 U.N.T.S. at 272-75. 
101. See Ted L. McDorman, The 1991 U.S.-Mexico GATT Panel Report On Tuna 
and Dolphin: Implications for Trade and Environment Conflicts, 17 N.C. J. INT'L L. & 
COM. REG. 461, 481-87 (1992). Some commentators have suggested that the conventions 
that would make excellent candidates for a GAIT waiver include: the Montreal Protocol, 
supra note 96; the Basel Convention, supra note 96; and CITES, supra note 96. See OTA 
REPORT, supra note 43, at 43-46; JACKSON II, supra note 26, at 1244-45. But see Sorsa, 
supra note 67, at 1003-11 (expressing doubt as to whether GAIT effectively can 
accommodate multilateral environmental treaties such as CITES). 
102. See, e.g., Montreal Protocol, supra note 96, art. 40 (banning import of 
ozone-depleting substances). 
103. See Schoenbaum, supra note 29, at 709-10, 721-23. Schoenbaum argues that 
even without a waiver, trade measures taken pursuant to an international environmental 
convention that targets a scientifically recognized threat to human health and safety-such 
as the Montreal Protocol, supra note 96-should qualify under the Article XX(b) excep-
tion. Id. at 720. 
104. Cf. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331, art. 30, 'lI 3 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980). Because GAIT predates the Vienna 
Convention, the Convention does not govern the interpretation of GAIT. Nevertheless, the 
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the exporting and importing countries concerned are signatories 
both of GATT and of the international environmental agreement. I OS 
2. Amend the GAIT Standards Code to Include Environmental 
Standards 
Because of the tremendous procedural obstacles to amending 
GATT, the next best alternative would be to negotiate a side ar-
rangement under GATT auspices. A negotiating strategy of side 
agreements was developed during the 1979 Tokyo Round of GATT 
multilateral trade negotiations ("MTNs"). At the Tokyo Round (the 
seventh in a series of GATT MTNs), a handful of GATT contract-
ing parties entered into nine side agreements, commonly referred 
to as "codes." Three of these agreements pertain to particular types 
of products, covering trade in civil aircraft, bovine meat, and dairy 
products, while the other six deal with specific nontariff barriers 
to trade, including government procurement, customs valuation, 
dumping, subsidies, licensing, and standards.lo6 
One of the nontariff barrier agreements, the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade (the "Standards Code"),I07 addressed 
the growing use of product standards as nontariff barriers to trade. 
The aim of the Standards Code is to ensure that procedures relating 
to product standards, regulations, testing, and certification are not 
in fact protectionist measures in disguise. lOS The thirty-eight Stand-
Vienna Convention primarily codifies customary international law on the subject of treaty 
interpretation and is considered authoritative. See Schoenbaum, silpra note 29, at 719 
n.108 (citing RESTATEMENT (3D) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES, pt. III, Introductory Note at 144 (1987». 
Such a modification of GATT by a later concluded treaty has occurred with the 
Multi-Fiber Arrangement ("MFA"), BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 21st 
Supp., at 3 (1975), 25 U.S.T. 1001, 430 U.N.T.S. 166, which takes textiles and wearing 
apparel outside of GATT disciplines and governs such trade through assigned quotas. See 
McDorman, silpra note 101, at 483-84. For a discussion of the MFA and its implementa-
tion in the United States, see American Ass'n of Exporters and Importers-Textiles and 
Apparel Group v. United States, 751 F.2d 1239 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
105. See Schoenbaum, silpra note 29, at 719; Geoffrey W. Levin, Note, The 
Environment and Trade-A Milltilateral Imperative, 1 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 231, 246 
(1992). 
106. A list of the Tokyo Round agreements and signatories appears in THE YEAR IN 
TRADE 1991, silpra note 62, at 48-49. 
107. See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, GATT Doc. Ll4812 (Nov. 12, 
1979), reprinted in BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 26th Supp., at 8 
(1980) [hereinafter Standards Code]. . 
108. See id., preamble, reprinted in BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED Docu-
MENTS, 26th Supp., at 8 (1980). 
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ards Code signatories lo9 are also encouraged to use internationally 
accepted harmonized standards whenever possible. llo 
The Standards Code is essentially an agreement on procedure. 
It does not create any substantive product standards or regulations. 
It aims to ensure that when signatories do implement and enforce 
product standards, such standards are transparent, reasonable, and 
based on product performance rather than design. III 
A revised and expanded Standards Code received tentative 
approval during the Uruguay MTN Round.llz It would extend Code 
coverage to product processes and production methods 
("PPMs"), 113 require any standard that is not internationally ac-
cepted to be based on scientific principles, mandate that trade-re-
strictive measures be closely tailored to meet their objectives, and 
obligate subnationallevels of government (cities, states, and prov-
inces) to adhere to the Code.ll4 Environmentalists have criticized 
the proposed Standards Code revisions for failing to take into 
account the goal of environmental protection or to fully recognize 
it as a legitimate technical barrier to trade. 115 
3. Exempt Environmental Subsidies from Countervailing Duty 
Laws 
Another related possibility would be to amend the GATT Sub-
sidies Code, another side agreement that emerged from the Tokyo 
Round. ll6 The Subsidies Code was intended to regulate government 
109. The signatories include Canada, the European Community, Japan, Mexico, and 
the United States. ld. 
110. See id. 
111. ld. 
112. See THE YEAR IN TRADE 1991, supra note 62, at 20. 
113. A related bill was introduced in the United States during the 102d Congress. 
S. 1965, the Global Clean Water Incentives Act, would permit the United States to impose 
a fee on imported products manufactured through processes that did not comply with the 
U.S. Clean Water Act. S. 1965, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). See also OTA REpORT, supra 
note 43, at 92. In the absence of a multilateral set of production processes to be regulated, 
this proposal, an extraterritorial imposition of U.S. standards abroad, would run into the 
same criticism received by the tuna import ban. 
114. See THE YEAR IN TRADE 1991, supra note 62, at 20. 
115. See WWF INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH REpORT, THE URUGUAY ROUND'S TECH-
NICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE AGREEMENT: LEGAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS (Jan. 
1993) [hereinafter THE URUGUAY ROUND'S TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE AGREEMENT]; 
Schoenbaum, supra note 29, at 717. 
116. Agreement on the Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII 
of the General Agreement, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, 1186 U.N.T.S. 204, reprinted in 
HeinOnline -- 18 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 210 1994
210 Harvard Environmental Law Review [18:185 
subsidies granted to domestic industries,. including preferential 
loans, grants, debt forgiveness, and preferential tax treatment. The 
Subsidies Code has achieved these regulatory aims only to a lim-
ited extent. Code signatories did succeed in reaching a consensus 
on export subsidies, banning all such subsidies on non-primary 
products. ll7 They failed to reach any meaningful commitment, how-
ever, on export subsidies of primary productsl18 and domestic sub-
sidies. 119 
The Subsidies Code did recognize the potential desirability of 
allowing certain types of environmental subsidies. Article 11 of the 
Code120 provides that signatories "do not intend to restrict the right 
of signatories to use such subsidies [i.e., subsidies other than ex-
port subsidies] to achieve these and other important policy objec-
tives' which they consider desirable."121 Among the objectives listed 
is "redeployment of industry in order to avoid . . . environmental 
BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 26th Supp., at 56 (1980) [hereinafter 
Subsidies Code]. 
117. Id. arts. 9-10, 31 U.S.T. at 531-32,1186 U.N.T.S. at 222-24. Primary products 
are products of farms, forests, and fisheries. Id. art. 9, 31 U.S.T. at 531, 1186 U.N.T.S. at 
222; GATT, supra note 17, art. XVI, § B, <J[ 2 Note, 61 Stat. at 51-52,55 U.N.T.S. at 250. 
Export subsidies are government benefits paid upon condition that the product be 
exported. In contrast, domestic subsidies are paid upon the manufacture and production of 
a product without regard to whether the product is ultimately exported. Export subsidies 
receive the greater disapprobation because, of the two types of subsidies, they are 
considered inherently trade distorting. See Kevin C. Kennedy, An Examination of Domestic 
Subsidies and the Standard for Imposing Countervailing Duties, 9 Loy. L.A. INT'L & 
COMPo L.J. 1 (1986); John Barcelo, Subsidies, Countervailing Duties and Antidumping 
After the Tokyo Round, 13 CORNELL lNT'L L.J. 257, 261 (1980). 
118. With regard to export subsidies on primary products, Article 10 of the 
Subsidies Code imposes a vague obligation on signatories not to grant such subsidies "in 
a manner which results in the signatory granting such subsidy having more than an 
equitable share of world export trade in such product .... " Id. art. 10,31 U.S.T. at 532, 
1186 U.N.T.S. at 224-26. (emphasis added). 
119. Subsidies Code, supra note 116, art. 11,31 U.S.T. at 532-34, 1186 U.N.T.S. 
at 224-26. 
120. Since it imposes no disciplinary measures on countries granting subsidies, 
Article 11 is without question the weakest part of the Subsidies Code. Article 11:4 
provides: 
Signatories recognize further that, without prejudice to their rights under this 
Agreement, nothing in paragraphs 1-3 above and in particular the enumeration 
of forms of subsidies creates, in itself, any basis for action under the General 
Agreement, as interpreted by this Agreement. 
Id. art. 11, <J[ 4,31 U.S.T. at 534, 1186 U.N.T.S. at 226. 
121. Subsidies Code, supra note 116, art. 11, <J[ 1, 31 U.S.T. at 532-33, 1186 
U.N.T.S. at 224. 
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problems." 122 Article II's exception for environmental subsidies 
may not be significant, however. The plain language o~ the Article 
11 exception suggests that it was most likely intended to allow 
subsidies to encourage relocation of polluting industries from 
highly congested and densely populated urban and business centers 
to new, less crowded locations. Relocation may mitigate pollution 
in the severely affected, densely populated areas, but the relocating 
industries still will be free to pollute in the new site. Thus these 
subsidies may not serve to abate the overall level of pollution. 
Although Article 11 does not expressly approve the use of 
subsidies to assist polluting industries in complying with pollution 
abatement programs, it is significant that the Subsidies Code does 
not ban environmental subsidies as it bans other export subsidies. 
In the course of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, consid-
eration was given to expanding Article 11 's exemption expressly 
to include transitional assistance to firms for pollution abatement 
expenditures.123 Nevertheless, U.S. countervailing duty law makes 
such subsidies illegal unless they are generally available to most 
or all industries within the exporting country.124 
Adopting a new U.S. policy relaxing U.S. unfair trade laws 
regarding pollution abatement subsidies would likely meet stiff 
resistance from U.S. domestic industry. Industry typically demands 
that U.S. trade laws be rigorous and that trade sanctions be vigor-
ously imposed. Nevertheless, if the United States wants to dangle 
"carrots of encouragement" to induce other countries to adopt more 
122. Id. art. 11, 'lI 1(f), 31 U.S.T. at 533, 1186 U.N.T.S. 224. 
123. THE YEAR IN TRADE 1991, supra note 62, at 21. 
124. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1677(5)(A)(ii), 1677(5)(B) (West Supp. 1993). If pollution 
abatement expenditures were subsidized by foreign governments, environmentalists in the 
United States might not object, but U.S. firms competing against the subsidized foreign 
firms almost certainly would. If the domestic firm is injured by those subsidized imports, 
and if the subsidies are available only to a specific industry or group of industries, then 
under U.S. trade law countervailing duties must be imposed equal to the amount of the 
subsidy. See id. § 1677(5)(A)-(B). The U.S. Commerce Department found countervailable, 
for example, the provision of interest-free loans to a specific enterprise for pollution 
control improvements. Viscose Rayon Staple Fiber from Sweden, 57 Fed. Reg. 6493 (1992). 
In Gray Portland Cement and Clinker from Venezuela, 56 Fed. Reg. 41,522, 41,524 (1991), 
however, Commerce concluded that loans for the purchase of environmental control 
equipment were not countervailable because they were not limited to a specific enterprise. 
See also Certain Steel Products from Belgium, 57 Fed. Reg. 57,750, 57,753 (1992) 
(declaring grants to steel companies to offset costs of complying with Clean Water Act 
countervailable). 
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stringent environmental regulations, then it should relax its coun-
tervailing duty law in cases where the exporting firm's government 
provides abatement incentives to polluting industries. 
If, as a result of pressure from the business community, the 
United States pursues a trade strategy that is more combative than 
cooperative, then "sticks" will be more frequently employed as 
policy tools than "carrots." Several such "sticks" vie for use in the 
environment/trade setting, as the following discussion demon-
strates. 
4. Deny GSP Beneficiary Status to Developing Countries with 
Lax Environmental Standards 
In the absence of a multilateral approach under GATT aus-
pices-such as the first three proposals-there are a number of 
unilateral strategies that the United States and other countries 
could adopt to deal with the trade/environment issue. One such 
possibility would be to deny Generalized System of Preferences 
("GSP") beneficiary status to countries that do not have or fail to 
enforce domestic pollution laws. GSP is a program of preferential 
tariffs offered by industrialized countries-primarily the members 
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
or "OECD"-on a nonreciprocal basis to promote the growth and 
development of less developed countries.125 Under the U.S. GSP 
program, approximately 130 countries have been designated as 
beneficiary countries. Selected imports from beneficiary countries 
are entitled to preferential tariff treatment more favorable than the 
already low MFN duty rate applicable to imports from GATT 
contracting parties. 126 
The United States may choose not to designate a particular 
developing country as a GSP beneficiary or it may revoke a coun-
125. See THE YEAR IN TRADE 1991, supra note 62, at 157. 
126. See id. This lower rate means that GSP "eligible imports usually receive 
duty-free treatment or duty treatment that is substantially lower than the prevailing MFN 
duty rate. Congress renewed the U.S. GSP program until September 30, 1994. Pub. L. No. 
1-3-66, 107 Stat. 667 (1993). The GSP legislation is codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2466 
(Supp. ill 1991). In 1991, the top ten exporters to the U.S. among GSP beneficiary 
countries under the U.S. GSP program were Mexico, Malaysia, Thailand, Brazil, the 
Philippines, India, Israel, Argentina, Indonesia, and the former Yugoslavia. See THE YEAR 
IN TRADE 1991, supra note 62, at 161. Of the total volume of GSP imports from these ten 
countries, Mexico's share was 28%. See id. 
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try's beneficiary status if that country engages in anyone of several 
enumerated acts: 127 (1) expropriating U.S.-owned property without 
just compensation;128 (2) failing to enforce an arbitral award in 
favor of a U.S. citizen;129 (3) supporting terrorism;130 or (4) failing 
to afford its citizens internationally recognized workers' rights. l3l 
A proviso analogous to the workers' rights proviso could be added 
to this list to the effect that countries will not be designated GSP 
beneficiaries and will not retain that designation if they fail to 
enforce internationally recognized environmental standards.132 
From the standpoint of international trade law and policy, this 
proposal is blatantly discriminatory, because it singles out devel-
oping countries for differential treatment vis-a-vis industrialized 
countries. Although developing countries would have no complaint 
of GATT nullification and impairment under Article XXIII insofar 
as the denial of GSP tariff status is concerned,133 they would have 
a GATT Article I complaint on the ground that their imports would 
be treated differently than imports from industrialized countries.134 
Beyond GATT-based complaints, implementing a tariff scheme that 
discriminates against developing countries' imports on environ-
mental grounds would almost certainly trigger the perennial accu-
sation that GATT is a rich man's club with rules written by the 
rich for the benefit of the rich. 
Using GSP beneficiary status to encourage protection of the 
environment is also problematic from the perspective of interna-
tional environmental law, since there is no international consensus 
127. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2462(b)(1)-(7) (West Supp. 1993). 
128. [d. § 2462(b)(4)(A). 
129. [d. § 2462(b)(5). 
130. [d. § 2462(b)(6). 
131. [d. § 2462(b)(7). 
132. See Hurlock, supra note 76, at 2113-17. A parallel amendment could be added 
to U.S. trade legislation that would deny the MFN duty rate to any industrialized country 
that fails to enforce internationally recognized environmental pollution standards. The 
MFN rate, which is on average less than 4% ad valorem on manufactured goods, is far 
lower than the alternative Smoot-Hawley tariff rates that can range from 10% to 100% ad 
valorem. For example, the MFN duty rate on imported cars is 2.5% ad valorem, while the 
Smoot-Hawley rate is 10%. Harmonized Tariff Schedules of the United States, No. 8703, 
Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1147 (1988). 
133. No country has a complaint under GATT when it is receiving at least the MFN 
duty rate. 
134. If a country promises MFN treatment to another country, the promisor country 
undertakes to give to the promisee country the benefit of any concession it has given, or 
may give, to any third state. In GATT, Article I is a rule of nondiscrimination among all 
parties with respect to the manner in which imports are treated. Under the proposal, 
HeinOnline -- 18 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 214 1994
214 Harvard Environmental Law Review [18:185 
on most environmental quality standards.135 For example, although 
participants at the Rio Earth Summit acknowledged the significant 
contribution that greenhouse gases make to global climate change, 
the Convention on Climate Change136 was watered down to such a 
degree that no specific targets or timetables appeared in the final 
draft.137 One obvious alternative, using U.S. domestic air and water 
quality standards, would be both controversial and confrontational. 
The best hope for reaching an international consensus on air and 
water quality standards is multilateral negotiation, not unilateral 
action. 
5. Amend GATT Article XIX to Authorize Trade Restrictions 
Imposed Pursuant to Domestic Environmental Protection Laws 
In a variation on the theme of taking unilateral trade measures 
to address environmental problems, GATT could be amended to 
incorporate by reference domestic environmental protection legis-
lation. For example, Article XIX could be amended to permit coun-
tries to impose trade restrictions on imported products manufac-
tured using processes that would violate the importing countries' 
domestic environmental protection laws. GATT would permit such 
measures, provided that the domestic industry could show that it 
was suffering as a result of the imports, as is currently required 
when escape clause relief is sought. 138 Under U.S. legislation im-
plementing GATT Article XIX, upon a finding by the U.S. Inter-
national Trade Commission that increased imports are a substantial 
cause of serious injury to domestic producers, the President may 
restrict those imports either by increasing tariffs, imposing quotas, 
or negotiating an orderly marketing agreement. 139 An exporting 
developing countries' imports would be discriminated against relative to imports to the 
United States, thereby violating the MFN commitment. One way of avoiding this discrimi-
natory treatment would be to treat all imports the same, whether from industrialized or 
developing countries, regarding compliance with environmental standards. 
135. See Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International Environmental Law, 86 
AM. J. INT'L L. 259 (1992). 
136. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, June 4,1992, U.N. Doc. AlAC.237/18(part II)/Add. 1 and 
Corr. 1, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992). 
137. See Elizabeth P. Barratt-Brown et al., A Fontmfor Action on Global Wanllillg: 
The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, 4 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'y 
103, 110-11 (1993). 
138. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (1988). 
139. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-53 (1988). 
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country adversely affected by escape clause relief would be per-
mitted, however, to recover from the importing country in the form 
of trade concessions in some other product sector.140 
On the positive side, the granting of escape clause relief does 
not require a finding that the imported product has been the subject 
of unfair trade practices. Moreover, such relief would probably be 
temporary and would only continue until such time as the domestic 
industry was no longer suffering injury or the foreign firm changed 
its manufacturing processes. The major shortcoming of this pro-
posal is that it permits an importing country to impose its own 
brand of environmental protection on its trading partners, albeit at 
the price of offsetting compensation. Although local environmental 
groups-and domestic industries confronted with significant for-
eign competition-might be placated by this proposal, it could 
prove provocative and invite trade retaliation, especially if no 
agreement could be reached on the appropriate compensation pack-
age. 
6. Impose Countervailing Duties on Imports from Countries 
with Lax Environmental Standards 
A somewhat more aggressive unilateral trade measure would 
be to use domestic environmental standards as the world standard 
against which all imports would be measured. Proposals have been 
made, some within Congress, to treat a country's failure to adopt 
and enforce environmental standards that are as rigorous as U.S. 
standards as a countervailable subsidy granted to that country's 
polluting domestic industries.141 Implementation of such a proposal 
would present several problems. First, how would the value of such 
a subsidy be measured? In a country with little environmental 
regulation, the benefit of noncompliance could not be measured by 
estimating the cost of compliance borne by other industries in that 
140. GAIT, supra note 17, art. XIX(3)(a), 61 Stat. at A60, 55 U.N.T.S. at 260. 
141. For example, S. 984, introduced in 1991, would have required the imposition 
of countervailing duties on imports from countries with lax environmental regulations. S. 
984, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). See OTA REpORT, supra note 43, at 92 (discussing 
other congressional proposals); Robert F. Housman, A Kantian Approach to Trade and the 
Environment, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1373, 1384-86 (1992); Thomas K. Plofchan, Jr., 
Recognizing and Countervailing Environmental Subsidies, 26 INT'L LAW. 763 (1992); 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS TO PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND WILDLIFE, USITC 
PUB. 2351, at 6-7 to 6-10 (1991) (Additional Views of Commissioner Rohr); Kenneth S. 
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country. Even if other polluting industries in the country were 
subject to regulation, drawing conclusions from the costs borne by 
these other industries would be like studying apples to learn about 
oranges; for example, it would be fruitless 142 to estimate the cost 
of environmental compliance for the steel industry from the cost 
of compliance borne by the computer industry. 
In the absence of a domestic benchmark in the exporting coun-
try, an alternative approach would be to compare the foregone costs 
of environmental regulations in the foreign industry to the actual 
costs borne by the U.S. competitors in that industry.143 At best, this 
alternative could only result in a cost figure that is a rough approxi-
mation of the actual costs the foreign industry would incur in 
complying with U.S. environmental standards. Additionally, using 
U.S. environmental laws and standards as the world benchmark 
would effectively repeal the law of comparative advantage insofar 
as it relates to environmental conditions. Countries' absorptive ca-
pacities for pollution are different, as countries vary in meteorol-
ogy, demography, and geography. Countries with fragile ecosys-
tems require tough environmental standards, whereas countries 
with robust ecosystems may not require such stringent environ-
mental regulation. Firms in more environmentally resilient coun-
tries have not necessarily received a subsidy that should trigger a 
countervailing duty, nor have they enjoyed an unfair competitive 
advantage through comparatively lax enforcement of environmental 
regulations. l44 For the United States to insist that a country adopt 
environmental standards as rigorous as U.S. standards would make 
the United States unnecessarily protectionist.145 
Komoroski, The Failure o/Governments to Regulate Industry: A Subsidy Under the GATT? 
10 Hous. J. INT'L L. 189 (1988); Michael Prieur, Environmental Regulations and Foreign 
Trade Aspects, 3 FLA. lNT'L L. J. 85 (1987). 
142. No pun intended. 
143. Such a proposal was introduced in the Senate. International Pollution Deter-
rence Act, S. 984, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). Under this proposal, not only would 
countervailing duties be imposed on imports from countries with weak environmental laws, 
but the countervailable subsidy would be estimated by the cost to the foreign firm of 
complying with U.S. clean air and water laws. Half the revenues collected in the form of 
countervailing duties would be earmarked for a fund to finance developing countries' 
purchases of pollution abatement technology. See OTA REPORT, supra note 43, at 92. 
144. One commentator rejects the comparative advantage argument and insists that 
environmental standards be harmonized upward, so that no country can claim that its 
absorptive capacity for pollution exempts it from the more stringent standards. See 
Schoenbaum, supra note 29, at 717. 
145. Aside from the thorny questions of valuation and comparative advantage, under 
the current U.S. countervailing duty law, a subsidy is not countervailable if it is generally 
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7. Impose Antidumping Duties on Imports from Countries with 
Lax Environmental Laws 
On a slight variation of the countervailing duty theme, the 
antidumping duty laws could be pressed into service to check lax 
foreign environmental laws or substandard enforcement of those 
laws. Domestic industries that are forced to compete with imports 
from countries with lower environmental standards often use the 
pejorative "ecological dumping" to describe this situation and have 
demanded that the playing field be leveled.146 Under the U.S. anti-
dumping duty law, if exporting foreign firms sell goods in their 
home market at prices higher than those charged in the U.S. mar-
ket, the United States will impose antidumping duties equal to the 
price differential on the imports if those underpriced imports are 
shown to cause injury to the domestic industry.147 
According to critics of "ecological dumping," in countries 
with lax environmental laws, firms are producing at costs below 
what their actual costs of production would be under rigorous 
environmental regulation.148 By using a constructed value method-
010gyl49 that includes a fixed amount for environmental compli-
ance, those environmental costs could be factored into the foreign 
available to all industries within a country. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
Thus, in a country with no environmental controls, all industries within that country would 
be beneficiaries of this "subsidy:' the "subsidy" would be generally available, and it would 
not, therefore, be countervailable under current U.S. law. See also Weiss, supra note 45, 
at 733-34, where the author expresses doubt about the effectiveness of countervailing 
duties as a trade measure to combat lax environmental regulation, in terms of identifica-
tion, quantification, and enforcement. 
146. See Levin, supra note 105, at 234 n.18. 
147. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1673 (1980 & West Supp. 1993). See Tracy Murray, The 
Administration of the Antidumping Duty Law by the Department of Commerce, in DOWN 
IN THE DUMPS: ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNFAm TRADE LAWS 23 (Richard Boltuck & 
Robert E. Litan eds. 1991) [hereinafter DOWN IN THE DuMPS]. When home market sales 
are insufficient to allow a price comparison, the Commerce Department will look to the 
foreign firm's sales in third countries to establish a comparison price to the U.S. price. If 
neither sufficient home market sales nor third-country sales exist, or if the volume of home 
market sales is not sufficiently high, then the Commerce Department resorts to a con-
structed value methodology. Even where there are sales in the home market, if those sales 
are made at prices below the foreign firm's cost of production, they are disregarded. [d. 
§ 1677b(b). 
148. This argument is essentially equivalent to that advanced by proponents of 
countervailing duties on imports from countries with lax environmental standards. See 
supra part IV.A.6. 
149. "Constructed value" is the sum of the cost of materials and fabrication, an 
amount for general expenses and profit, and the cost of all containers. 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1677b(e)(I). A constructed value method is currently used for profit and general 
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firm's total constructed cost of production. This constructed cost 
of production would then be used to calculate the amount of duty 
to apply to the imported product. 
The difficulty with using a fixed percentage is that, at best, it 
would merely represent an average of environmental costs incurred 
across a broad spectrum of businesses, presumably those in the 
United States. Such an amendment would be criticized, even 
though different foreign. firms would be polluting at varying levels 
Gust as some businesses are more profitable than others), because 
the same minimum percentage would arbitrarily apply to all of the 
. exporting firms. ISO 
Furthermore, if a foreign manufacturer's production costs were 
to include a statutory minimum amount equal to American firms' 
environmental compliance costs, then it would be relatively easy 
to extend this cost-of-production rationale to differences in labor 
or to other social welfare costs borne by U.S. producers. lSI If those 
differences in production costs were required to be factored into 
the cost-of-production analysis, as well, then U.S. producers' costs 
would become the benchmark for dumping, effectively undoing the 
benefits of "comparative advantage" brought about by international 
trade. 
8. Amend Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 
Amending the countervailing and antidumping duty laws or 
the escape clause would result in a narrowly focused basis for 
challenging foreign environmental regulation. A broader base of 
attack might be provided if section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 
were amended.152 While the overwhelming majority of U.S. unfair 
trade laws focus on the import side of the world trade ledger, 
expenses under the U.S. antidumping duty law, with fixed minima of 8% and 10% 
respectively. [d. § 1677b(e)(I)(B)(i)-(ii). 
150. These criticisms have been leveled at the fixed statutory minimum profit and 
general expenses percentages. See N. David Palmeter, The Antidumping Law: A Legal and 
Administrative Nontariff Barrier, in DOWN IN THE DUMPS, supra note 147, at 64, 75. 
151. This has to some extent already taken place. Under the Generalized System of 
Preferences and the Caribbean Basin Initiative, developing countries that do not enforce 
minimum labor standards are ineligible for beneficiary status. In addition, under § 301 of 
the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1980 & West Supp. 1993), countries that do not 
respect minimum labor rights commit an unfair trade practice. See Levin, supra note 105, 
at 249-50. 
152. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411 (1980 & West Supp. 1993). 
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section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 is designed to open foreign 
markets that are restricted or closed to U.S. exports of goods, 
services, or capital.153 Section 301 targets four general types of 
unfair foreign trade practices: (1) those that violate existing inter-
national agreements with the United States;154 and those that un-
fairly burden U.S. commerce because they are (2) "un-
justifiable,"155 (3) "unreasonable,"156 or (4) "discriminatory."157 If 
the foreign trade practice is either violative of a trade agreement 
or is unjustifiable, action by the U.S. Trade Representative 
("USTR") is required to enforce U.S. rights or seek elimination of 
the practice.158 For acts or practices that are unreasonable or dis-
criminatory, the USTR has discretionary authority to take action. 159 
Section 301 provides the USTR with an arsenal of retaliatory 
weapons that includes withdrawal of trade benefits and imposition 
of duties on imports of goods from the offending country.160 
"Unreasonable" practices are those that are "unfair and inequi-
table."161 This definition is far from unambiguous and could be 
interpreted to include the failure of a country to enact and enforce 
environmental measures. Failure to enact and enforce laws that 
provide for minimum environmental protection could be added162 
to the Act's current list of illustrations of unreasonable practices.163 
The difficulty with this proposal is more procedural than sub-
153. Id. §§ 2411(a)(1), 2411(d)(1). See Bart S. Fisher & Ralph G. Steinhardt, 
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Protection for u.s. Exporters of Goods, Services, 
and Capital, 14 LAW. & POL'y INT'L Bus. 569 (1982); Robert E. Hudec, Retaliation 
Against "Unreasonable" Foreign Trade Practices: The New Section 301 and GATT 
Nullification and Impairment, 59 MINN. L. REv. 461 (1975). 
154. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411(a)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1993). 
155. Id. § 2411(a)(1)(B)(ii). A definition of "unjustifiable" trade practices, together 
with examples, is contained in the Act at id. § 2411 (d) (4). 
156. Id. § 2411(b)(1). A definition of "unreasonable" trade practices, together with 
examples, is contained in the Act at id. § 2411(d)(3). 
157. Id. § 2411(b)(1). A definition of "discriminatory" trade practices is found at 
id. § 2411(d)(5). 
158. Id. § 2411(a). 
159. Id. § 2411(b). 
160. Id. § 2411(c). For a summary of section 301 investigations initiated or con-
tinuing in 1991, see THE YEAR IN TRADE 1991, supra note 62, at 151-56. 
161. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411(d)(3)(a) (West Supp. 1993). 
162. A bill introduced in the Senate in 1991 would have amended section 301 to 
make the failure to protect the environment an unfair trade practice. General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade for the Environment Act of 1991, S. 59, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). 
163. This list already includes restricting foreign direct investment; failing to 
protect intellectual property rights; failing to enforce antitrust laws; and failing to enact 
and enforce worker health, safety, hour, and wage laws. Id. § 2411(d)(B)(i)-(iii). 
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stantive. Under section 301, the USTR's Office acts simultaneously 
as prosecutor, judge, and jury. Section 301 essentially is a unilat-
eral method of dispute resolution and repeatedly has been con-
demned as such for being inco~sistent with GATT's bilateraVmul-
tilateral dispute settlement approach. '64 Adding environmental 
issues to the section 301 list of unreasonable trade practices, there-
fore, might inflame resentment abroad. 
9. Impose an Environmental Tax on Imports 
The use of taxes to shape behavior is as old as the tax code. 
In the tuna/dolphin dispute, Mexico successfully challenged before 
a GATT Panel an import ban based on a product's production 
processes rather than the inherent characteristics of the product.16s 
Along these lines, legislation introduced in the 102d Congress 
proposed imposition of a fee on imports manufactured through 
processes that do not comply with the Clean Water Act. 166 Such an 
import duty would act as an alternative to an import ban. This 
proposal only partially satisfies GATT's national treatment com-
mitment, because no tax would be imposed directly on the U.S. 
domestic producer. Arguably, however, the compliance costs would 
be equivalent to payment of an environmental tax. 167 Professor 
Frederic Kirgis also has suggested a tax/fee proposal directed at 
promoting environmentally sound production processes that argu-
ably would be consistent with GATT.'68 In order to withstand chal-
lenges under GATT, the tax would have to be imposed directly on 
specific products even though targeted at production processes. It 
also would have to be nondiscriminatory vis-a-vis the tax treatment 
that the comparable domestic product receives-thereby correcting 
the disparate tax treatment found in S. 1965-and be nondiscrimi-
natory with regard to the country of origin, so as not to violate the 
MFN commitment.169 
164. See generally Jagdish Bhagwati, It's the Process, StlIpid, ECONOMIST, Mar. 27, 
1993, at 69; Bello & Holmer, supra note 76; Levin, supra note 105, at 256-63. 
165. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
166. Global Clean Water Incentives Act, S. 1965, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). 
167. Article III(2) of GAIT requires non-discriminatory tax treatment between 
imported goods and the like domestic product. 
168. Kirgis, supra note 76, at 1222. 
169. An environmental tax imposed by the United States on imported oil and 
chemicals as part of the Superfund legislation was upheld in part by a GATT Panel that 
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The shortcomings of this proposal are twofold. First, if the 
environmental tax is levied on foreign industries and not on Ameri-
can firms, the national treatment commitment would be violated.170 
Domestic firms, however, would naturally resist the imposition of 
a formal pollution tax, and would claim that they already pay an 
equivalent amount through the costs they incur in complying with 
current clean air and water standards. Second, an environmental 
tax is not primarily a revenue raising measure, but rather a behavior 
modifying one, intended to discourage certain conduct such as use 
of environmentally unsound manufacturing processes. Thus, a ra-
tional, nonpunitive tax would probably exempt firms that meet 
certain pollution standards. In order for foreign firms to qualify for 
the exemption, they too would have to comply with those same 
standards. Consequently, the United States once again would be 
engaged in extraterritorial assertion of legislative jurisdiction by 
unilaterally imposing its pollution standards on the world. More-
over, although the tax would be imposed nominally on the im-
ported product, in actuality, the tax would target foreign production 
processes that do not comply with U.S. environmental standards, 
thus violating GATT multilateralism. 
Politically, such "upward harmonization" is a source of poten-
tial friction between the United States and its trading partners. U.S. 
trading partners may perceive the policy as protectionist insofar as 
it has the effect of destroying the benefits of comparative advantage 
by attempting to eliminate cost differentials among countries at-
tributable to variations in resources and environmental charac-
teristics.l7l As previously mentioned, targeting production proc-
esses also violates GATT's national treatment obligation. 172 It is 
doubtful that any GATT panel would overlook the realities of such 
a tax and decline to lift the veil covering this thinly disguised 
protectionist measure.173 Even assuming that the environmental tax 
stated that "[w]hether a sales tax is levied on a product for general revenue purposes or 
to encourage the rational use of environmental resources. is therefore not relevant for the 
determination of the eligibility of a tax for border tax adjustment." United States-Taxes 
on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances. Report of the Panel. GAIT Doc. Ll6175 
'll 5.2.4 (June 17. 1987). reprinted in BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS. 
34th Supp .• at 136. 161 (1988) and in 27 I.L.M. 1601. 1614 (1988). 
170. See Schoenbaum. supra note 29. at 72l. 
171. See generally Stewart. supra note 28. 
172. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text; see also supra note 89 and 
accompanying text. 
173. See JACKSON II. supra note 26. at 1236-37. 
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were evenhanded relative to imports and like domestic products,174 
in the absence of a widely accepted scientific justification for the 
tax, it could still run afoul of the GATT Standards Code. 17s 
10. Permit States to Adopt Nondiscriminatory, Proportional 
Environmental Measures 
In view of the different priorities nations have placed on pro-
tecting the environment, some commentators hold little hope for 
reaching a consensus on rules for minimal global environmental 
protection.I76 Consequently, by using the European Community and 
the Treaty of Rome as a model,177 countries could be permitted to 
adopt whatever environmental regulations they desire, even if these 
measures restrict trade. Under this proposal, the only limitation on 
such regulation would be that such measures not be disguised 
barriers to trade and that they be nondiscriminatory and "propor-
tional," that is, nonexcessive in light of the environmental goal 
bejng sought. I78 
Within the European Community, the European Court of J us-
tice has jurisdiction to rule on the consistency of member states' 
environmental regulations with the Treaty of Rome. Within a 
wholly domestic setting, national courts also may evaluate the 
propriety of environmental laws. However, outside of these con-
174. See Schoenbaum, supra note 29, at 720, where the author argues that an 
environmental tax would necessarily be discriminatory and therefore would violate the 
MFN obligation because it would be based on the geographic origin of the product. 
175. The Standards Code provides that "[p]arties shall ensure that technical regula-
tions and standards are not prepared, adopted or applied with a view to creating obstacles 
to international trade." Standards Code, supra note 107, art. 2, ~ 2.1, reprinted in BASIC 
INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 26th Supp., at 9 (1980). See also JACKSON II, 
supra note 26, at 1237-39. 
176. See, e.g., Abbott, supra note 63, at 32; M.P.A. Kindall, Talking Past Each Other 
At the Summit, 4 COLO. J. INT'L ENVT'L L. & POL'y 69 (1993). 
177. Article 130t of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community 
provides that "[t]he protective measures [on the environment] adopted in common ... 
shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or introducing more stringent 
protective measures compatible with this Treaty." TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN 
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, art. 130t (as amended 1987). 
178. Abbott, supra note 63, at 32. For a discussion of the nondiscrimination and 
proportionality requirements, see Toni R.F. Sexton, Note, Enacting National Environmental 
Laws More Stringent than Other States' Laws in the European Community: Re Disposable 
Beer Cans: Commission v. Denmark, 24 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 563 (1991). A similar 
proposal has been made, drawing from the U.S. domestic experience with the "dormant 
commerce clause" doctrine, to employ a balancing test using nondiscrimination and a 
rational means-end relationship as criteria. See Porter, supra note 4, at 114-15. 
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texts, there is no binding international dispute resolution forum to 
adjudicate questions of good faith, discrimination, or proportional-
ity in conflicts involving international trade. 
At least two, and possibly three, procedural changes would 
need to be made within the GATT context before the European 
Community model could be -applied on a global basis. First, the 
GATT dispute settlement machinery would have to be reformed to 
provide for, among other things, binding dispute resolution.179 Sec-
ond, this reform would have to be coupled with a GATT waiver 
permitting contracting parties to adopt nondiscriminatory, propor-
tional environmental protection measures. 
A third reform that also would be of immense assistance, if 
environmental factors are to be considered fully in the environ-
ment/trade calculus, would be the adoption of the environmental-
ists' "precautionary principle" that presumes, in essence, that envi-
ronmental concerns receive primacy over trade concerns. 180 
Adopting the precautionary principle would overcome the hurdle 
that countries limiting imports face in proving that a particular 
trade measure taken for environmental reasons is proportional. 
Adoption of the precautionary principle in the international trade 
context would prove invaluable in cases where scientific opinion is 
either divided or the evidence is inconclusive. In that event, once 
the respondent country demonstrates that there is a risk of environ-
mental damage unless the trade measure is imposed, and that the 
risk is not pretextual, the burden would shift to the petitioning 
country to show that there is no scientific basis for excluding the 
product on health and safety grounds. 
The obvious difficulty with the precautionary principle is that 
it creates a strong presumption, virtually irrebuttable, in favor of 
the legality of trade measures taken ostensibly on environmental 
grounds. In the hands of a country with strong protectionist ten-
dencies, or under heavy domestic pressure to adopt protectionist 
policies, adoption of the precautionary principle could pose a sub-
stantial risk to free trade. 
Three themes run through the foregoing reform proposals: 
179. See Victoria Curzon Price, New Institutional Developments in GATT, 1 MINN. 
J. GLOBAL TRADE 87 (1992). 
180. For a description of the "precautionary principle:' see Don't Green GATT, 
ECONOMIST, Dec. 26, 1992, at 15; THE URUGUAY ROUND'S TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO 
TRADE AGREEMENT, supra note 115, at 4-5. 
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multilateralism, unilateralism, and extraterritoriality. Multilateral-
ism is the prevalent theme in the proposals that call for reform in 
the context of GATT. As discussed above, however, there are sig-
nificant obstacles to making GATT more responsive to environ-
mental concerns without simultaneously jeopardizing free trade. 
Moreover, reaching a broad multilateral consensus on international 
environmental standards is highly problematic in practice, not least 
of all because the world's countries are at different stages of eco-
nomic development. 
The themes of unilateralism and extraterritoriality are preva-
lent in the reform proposals that call for amendments to U.S. 
domestic trade legislation. As the next section argues, however, 
unilateral action and attempts to apply domestic law extraterritori-
ally are controversial and provocative, and neither solution can 
promise sweeping global environmental reform. 
B. Problems with Unilateral Trade Sanctions 
A major case study on the use of economic sanctions as a 
foreign policy tooP81 identified five predominant foreign policy 
objectives that a "sender" country, that is, the country imposing 
sanctions, may seek: changing target-country policies in a rela-
tively minor way; destabilizing the target government; disrupting 
a minor military venture; impairing the military potential of the 
target country; and changing target-country policies in a major 
way.182 The first and last of these goals encompass the use of trade 
sanctions for environmental objectives. 
The historical use of trade sanctions reveals that export con-
trols, sometimes in combination with financial restrictions, have 
been preferred over import controls.183 Import controls are disfa-
vored, because the target country can find alternative export mar-
181. GARY C. HUFBAUER ET AL., INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, 
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED: HISTORY AND CURRENT POLICY (2d ed. 1990) 
[hereinafter HUFBAUER]; see also Carter, supra note 5. 
182. See HUFBAUER, supra note 181, at 38. The "minor"l"major" language used to 
describe the first and fifth objectives attempts to distinguish "minor" changes such as 
signing a human rights or nuclear nonproliferation agreement from "major" changes such 
as ceding territory. 
183. The Hufbauer study cites only one case in which import controls alone were 
used as a foreign policy weapon: an unsuccessful Soviet boycott of Australian wool aimed 
at securing the return of a Soviet diplomat who defected. See id. at 36. 
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kets, and, from the perspective of the sanctioning country, verifica-
tion of the country of origin of imported goods can be difficult. 184 
The study devises a "success score" based on the level of the 
policy result achieved and the contribution made by sanctions in 
reaching that result.18S It concludes that in one-third of the fifty-one 
cases analyzed, where the goal sought was a modest policy change 
in the target country, the sender country made some progress in 
achieving its goal through the use of economic sanctions.186 In 
contrast, in cases where the sender country sought the more ambi-
tious goal of a major policy change in the target country, only one 
quarter of the twenty cases analyzed demonstrated modest progress 
by the sender country.187 The study concludes: 
Although it is not true that sanctions "never work," they are of 
limited utility in achieving foreign policy goals that depend on 
compelling the target country to take actions it stoutly resists. 
Still, in some instances, particularly situations involving small 
target countries and relatively modest policy goals, sanctions 
have helped alter foreign behavior.188 
The study advises policy-makers to consider a set of nine basic 
propositions when contemplating the imposition of sanctions. 189 
184. See id. 
185. See id. at 41-42. 
186. See id. at 50. In those 17 cases, the average time period during which sanctions 
were imposed was 2.8 years. See id. at 51. 
187. See id. at 55. 
188. [d. at 92. 
189. The nine basic propositions are as follows: 
1. Sanctions seldom bring about major changes in the policies of the target country. 
See id. at 94. 
2. In general, the greater the number of countries required to implement sanctions, 
the less likely they will be effective. Unilateral sanctions should be employed when the 
need for cooperation from allies is slight. See id. at 95-96. This proposition includes the 
problems of additional time required for agreement among multiple parties. 
3. Target countries experiencing distress or significant problems are far more likely 
to yield. See id. at 97. 
4. Economic sanctions are more effective when directed at close trading partners. 
See id. at 99. 
5. Sanctions imposed slowly invite evasion and afford the target country the 
opportunity to adjust. See id. at 100-01. 
6. Imposing sanctions in a comprehensive manner improves the chances for success. 
See id. at 102. 
7. Sanctions are unlikely to succeed when the economic costs to the sender country 
are high. See id. at 102-03. 
8. Sender parties should consider alternatives to sanctions ("choose the right tool 
for the job"). [d. at 104-05. 
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Three of these propositions bear directly on the question of when 
and whether trade measures should be imposed for environmental 
ends. 
The second proposition instructs that unilateral imposition of 
trade sanctions might not work, because the target country might 
be able to circumvent the sanctions by finding alternative markets 
for its products. I90 
The third proposition states that sanctions will be more likely 
to succeed against economically weak and vulnerable countries. 
The volume of trade between the United States and developing 
countries, where environmental protection may not be especially 
stringent, is relatively small overall but of great importance to the 
developing countries.I9I The value of trade sanctions against these 
countries, however, is questionable, because the sanctions may re-
inforce negative perceptions of the United States as a bully of 
weaker nations. The United States might have economic leverage, 
but browbeating small countries with correspondingly small impact 
upon the global environment may be politically unwise. 
The fourth proposition holds that sanctions wQrk better when 
close trading partners are targeted. The closest trading partners of 
the United States-those countries that account for the largest 
percentages of total merchandise trade-are Canada, Japan, and 
Mexico. 192 
9. The unintended costs and consequences of sanctions, particularly the domestic 
fallout from sanctions imposed for symbolic purposes, should be carefully analyzed ("look 
before you leap"). [d. at 105. 
190. This assumes that all of the target's export trade does not go to the sanctioning 
country. For example, if the United States unilaterally imposed an import ban on environ-
mental grounds on products from China, China might be able to find alternative markets 
in Japan and the EC. In 1991, while 9% of China's exports went to the United States, 
45% went to Hong Kong, 14% to Japan, and 9% to the EC. U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
COMMISSION, PUB. 2621, EAST ASIA: REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND IMPLICA-
TIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 41 (May 1993). 
191. In 1991, the United States imported $96 billion worth of merchandise from 
some 130 GSP (Generalized System of Preferences) beneficiary countries, of which 
$30 billion came from Mexico. THE YEAR IN TRADE 1991, sllpra note 62, at 157, 160-61. 
Thus, total GSP imports in 1991 were less than 20% of the $483 billion in total world 
merchandise imports into the United States. See Chartbook: Composition of u.s. Merchan-
dise Trade 1988-92, INT'L ECON. REV., Mar. 1993 (special ed.), at 12 [hereinafter 
Composition of u.s. Merchandise Trade]. If trade with Mexico is excluded, that percentage 
drops to less than 14%. . 
192. In 1992, the United States exported $425 billion worth of merchandise to the 
entire world. See Composition of u.s. Merchandise Trade, sllpra note 191, at 12. In 1992, 
the volume of U.S. export trade to the EC was $97 billion, see id. at 38; to Canada, 
$83 billion, see id. at 29; to Japan, $46 billion, see id. at 63; and to Mexico, $40 billion. 
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The United States cannot justify a "holier than thou" stance 
with these countries and their environmental records. In 1989, the 
United States released the greatest percentage of global greenhouse 
gas emissions-17.3% of the world total.193 Moreover, since the 
environmental protection laws of the European Community, Can-
ada and Japan generally do not differ from those of the United 
States, it would be unlikely for the United States to target these 
nations with environmental trade sanctions.194 The same may hold 
true even for a developing country such as Mexico, which is mod-
elling its environmental statutes after the U.S. clean air and water 
laws.195 If the United States were· to impose trade sanctions against 
imports from its major trading partners on environmental grounds, 
due to minor legal differences in regulations, the United States 
would probably face retaliation from the affected states. Once 
countries enter the vicious circle of imposition of trade sanctions 
and retaliation, it may be difficult to avert an all-out trade war. 196 
In such a war, the environment could be a big loser.197 
C. Pursuing Multilateral Alternatives 
As noted in the preceding section, unilateral trade sanctions 
are problematic. A better long-term approach for the United States 
See id. at 32. These figures total $266 billion, or 62% of all U.S. merchandise export trade. 
On the import side of the ledger in 1992, the total was $524 billion. See id. The United 
States imported $92 billion in merchandise from the EC, see id. at 38; $98 billion from 
Canada, see id. at 29; $95 billion from Japan, see id. at 63; and $34 billion from Mexico, 
see id. at 32. These figures total $319 billion, or 61 % of all U.S. merchandise import trade. 
193. See Scott Stevens, Global Resources and Systems at Risk, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, June 2, 1992, at 11. The corresponding figures for the E.C., Japan, and Mexico 
are 11.2%,4.9%, and 1.9% respectively, for a combined total of 18%-just slightly more 
than the populous United States. [d. 
194. For a summary of the environmental protection laws of the major industrialized 
countries, see generally J. ANDREW SCHLICKMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW AND REGULATION (1992). United States trade sanctions may, however, target 
a country's extra-normal activities, such as Japanese harvesting of whales. See infra notes 
219, 226 and accompanying text. 
195. See Overview-The North American Free Trade Agreement, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. 
(BNA) No. 34, at 1474, 1477 (Aug. 19, 1992). Mexico's record as to enforcement of its 
environmental laws has been poor, but the government is improving its commitment to 
environmental protection and enforcement. See id. at 1477. 
196. See, e.g., Clayton Jones, Japan Fires a Shot Over the Bow of Clinton's 
"Managed Trade", CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 11, 1993, at 1, 4. 
197. Theoretically, only the most efficient producers would survive in the open 
markets for which the GATT negotiations aim. In a trade war, the walls of protectionism 
are erected to insulate inefficient producers from foreign competition. Inefficient producers 
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would be to negotiate multilateral environmental conventions based 
upon international consensus. This would help resolve the dilemma 
of maintaining American competitiveness in the international 
economy while pursuing the country's global environmental 
goals.198 
Despite some past successes in the field of multilateral envi-
ronmental conventions,199 there are several problems with this ap-
proach. Multilateral environmental conventions are sometimes 
vague,zoo often hortatory rather than mandatory,201 and typically 
contain weak and ineffective enforcement mechanisms.202 More-
over, such conventions are rarely universally accepted.203 
Future environmental treaties should be adopted under the 
auspices of GATT. The parties to GATT should undertake a mul-
tilateral approach and, at least in the near term, focus on procedure 
rather than dwell on more contentious specific standards. The 
Tokyo Round Codes provide a useful modeJ.204 The major trading 
consume more resources and thus cause more harm to the environment than their efficient 
competitors. See Greening, supra note 70, at 25. 
198. See Alan F. Holmer & Judith H. Bello, Trade and the Environment: A Snapshot 
from TunaJDoiphins to the NAFTA and Beyond, 27 INT'L LAW. 169, 176 (1993). 
199. See, e.g., Montreal Protocol, supra note 96. 
200. See, e.g., Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 
1985, S. TREATY Doc. No.9, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1529 
(entered into force Sept. 22, 1988) (calling for cooperation in research and observation, 
but requiring no substantive change). 
201. See, e.g., United Nations Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pol-
lution, Nov. 13, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 10,541, (1979), U.N. Doc. ECEIHLM.IIR.I, reprinted 
in 18 I.L.M. 1442 (1979) (entered into force Mar. 16, 1983) (recognizing the need for 
ameliorating pollution, but not mandating any specific pollution control measures). 
202. See, e.g., CITES, supra note 96, art. XVIII, 27 U.S.T. at 1114-15, 993 
U.N.T.S. at 256; Illegal Trafficking in Wildlife Persists, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 8, 
1993, at 15 ("the lack of commitment of some CITES nations keeps the treaty from living 
up to its promise" (quoting Ginette Hemley, World Wildlife Fund»; Hamilton Southworth, 
m, Comment, GATT and the Environment-General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
Trade and the Environment, GATT Doc. 1529 (February 13,1992),32 VA. J. INT'L L. 997, 
1003-13 (1992) (analyzing problems related to enforcement of CITES). 
203. Recall, for example, the refusal of the United States to sign the Biodiversity 
Convention at the 1992 Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro. See Melinda Chandler, The 
Biodiversity Convention: Selected Issues of Interest to the International Lawyer, 4 COLO. 
J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'y 141 (1993). 
204. See supra part IV.A.2 for a discussion of the Tokyo Round Codes. For a history 
of the negotiations leading up to the completion of the Tokyo Round Codes, see GILBERT 
R. WINHAM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE TOKYO ROUND NEGOTIATION 212-55 
(1986). In the current round of GATT trade negotiations, for example, the Code approach 
may in fact be adopted in order to conclude an agreement covering trade in services. Rules 
dealing with free trade in services would be reduced to a side agreement that would be 
open to all GATT members. It is expected, however, that only a handful of GATT 
contracting parties would initially join such a Code. 
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nations signed on to these Codes, which in most cases have their 
own separate dispute resolution machinery.205 
An agreement for a GATT Code devoted to trade and the 
environment could build on the Standards Code and its amend-
ments as proposed during the Uruguay MTN Round. The Standards 
Code currently covers only measures imposed upon imported prod-
ucts based upon technical regulations addressing the characteristics 
of the product itself.206 The Uruguay Round amendments would 
extend the Standards Code to cover Production and Process Meth-
ods,207 thereby internationalizing an area previously controlled by 
domestic legislation.208 
Twenty years ago the OECD countries adopted the principle 
that a pollution tax should be imposed upon polluters-the "pol-
luter pays principle."209 A Trade and Environment Code would 
pursue this economic model. The Code's signatories would, how-
ever, have to determine in advance which PPMs would constitute 
a permissible ground for imposition of a trade measure. This pro-
vision would attempt to further uniform implementation and dis-
courage unilateral trade protection measures cloaked in an environ-
mental guise. 
In a further departure from the Tokyo Round Code model, the 
administration and enforcement of a Trade and Environment Code 
would occur exclusively at the international, rather than the domes-
tic, levePlo In other words, only internationally agreed-upon PPMs 
would be permissible grounds for excluding a product for environ-
mental reasons, and the dispute settlement process would be con-
205. See supra part IV.A.2. 
206. In the Uruguay Round negotiations, amendments have been proposed to the 
Standards Code permitting measures to be taken against an imported product on environ-
mental grounds. Such targeting, however, would still be limited to measures taken against 
a product that itself poses a threat to the environment. The proposals do not authorize 
trade restrictions imposed on the ground that the production method caused pollution in 
the exporting country. See Lang, supra note 46, at 19-21. See s!lpra notes 112-115 and 
accompanying text. 
207. See Patrick Low & Raed Safadi, Trade Policy and Pollution, in WORLD BANK 
DISCUSSION PAPERS No. 159, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 29, 40 
(Patrick Lowed. World Bank 1992); 'THE URUGUAY ROUND'S TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO 
TRADE AGREEMENT, supra note 115, at 3-4. For a discussion of international organizations 
that might set forth technical standards and regulations, see Low & Safadi at 18-21. 
208. See Low & Safadi, supra note 207, at 4. 
209. ld. at 35. See also supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
210. The Tokyo Round Codes are characterized primarily by dispute resolution in 
international forums, but they do not preclude the parties from resorting to domestic 
dispute resolution alternatives. 
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ducted before an international tribunal. Such multilateral actions 
would signal a recognition by signatories that PPMs are a legiti-
mate source of international concern. 
A Trade and Environment Code that would embody this rec-
ognition should be based on the following five commitments: 
First, signatories would reaffirm their commitment to the prin-
ciples of nondiscrimination embodied in the MFN and national 
treatment obligations of GATT Articles I and III,211 respectively, 
and to observe those commitments whenever trade measures are 
imposed against another signatory's products on environmental 
grounds. Such reaffirmation is important, because of the dangers 
of hidden protectionism inherent in permitting ostensibly environ-
mentally grounded trade sanctions. 
Second, signatories should impose trade measures against the 
products of any other signatory based on the PPMs of the manu-
facturing of the product-or for any other reason based on envi-
ronmental grounds-only in a manner consistent with the Code. 
The TunalDolphin Panel report212 interpreted Article XX of GATT 
to permit the imposition of trade measures against a product solely 
on the ground that the product itself, rather than the method by 
which the product was processed or manufactured, poses a threat 
to the environment.213 Currently, complaints may be lodged under 
Article 14.25 of the Standards Code for the exclusion of imports 
based on technical standards drafted "in terms of processes and 
production methods rather than in terms of characteristics of prod-
uctS."2I4 A Trade and Environment Code would alter this rule. 
Article 14.25 could be amended to permit trade measures based on 
PPMS.2I5 
Third, in order to harmonize environmental regulations and 
standards as widely as possible, the signatories should prepare and 
adopt international environmental standards governing PPMs and 
other areas of environmental concern. These standards would be 
adopted under the auspices of appropriate international environ-
211. See GATT, supra note 17. 
212. See supra note 86. 
213. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
214. Standards Code, supra note 107, art. 14.25, reprinted in BASIC INSTRU~ENTS 
AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 26th Supp., at 26 (1980). 
215. See supra notes 112-115 and accompanying text. 
HeinOnline -- 18 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 231 1994
1994] Environmental Trade 231 
mental bodies, such as the United Nations Environment Program. 
Where there is no international standard, or where the international 
environmental standard differs substantially from the signatory's 
domestic standard, the signatory may nevertheless require reason-
able labelling requirements for the product. This labelling could 
notify importing consumers that the product's method of process-
ing does not comply with the signatory's domestic environmental 
regulations. Before taking such measures, the proposed labelling 
requirement would be made public, in order to allow a reasonable 
opportunity for comment and discussion by other signatories. This 
provision would be modelled on Article 2.5 of the Standards Code, 
which requires notice and an opportunity to comment before the 
introduction of a domestic standard.216 Such a procedure would 
codify the GATT Panel's ruling in the tuna/dolphin dispute that the 
United States could require labelling on cans advising consumers 
that the tuna had not been caught in a dolphin-friendly manner.217 
Harmonizing PPMs, however, will not necessarily advance the 
goal of internalizing environmental externalities in the production 
process.218 Harmonization makes sense among countries with simi-
lar production functions, incomes and tastes. Conversely, harmoni-
zation of dissimilar countries may be unnecessarily intrusive. In-
efficiency would result from forcing countries to adopt strict 
environmental measures when their geographical conditions would 
allow for comparatively more polluting manufacturing processes.219 
Nevertheless, this second-best solution is superior to that of unilat-
eralism because of the danger of eco-imperialism. Reaching mul-
tilateral agreement on PPM standards must become a priority, be-
fore importing countries begin to unilaterally impose trade 
restrictions on an exporting country's products based on PPMs. 
Fourth, in pursuing harmonization, signatories should be sen-
sitive to building consensus and finding common ground. Adopting 
PPMs that promote, for example, human health or consumer pro-
tection may gain acceptance more quickly than attempts aimed at 
such abstract notions such as preserving ecosystems.220 Accord-
216. See supra note 107. 
217. Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 86, at'll 5.44. 
218. See, e.g., Low & Safadi, supra note 207, at 40. 
219. See id. 
220. See id. at 40. 
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ingly, from the outset, signatories must set priorities concerning 
which types of PPMs to regulate.221 
Fifth, in the event of a conflict between the Code and any other 
applicable international agreement to which the two countries are 
signatories, the terms of the latter would govern.222 Absent any such 
agreement, trade sanctions imposed on environmental grounds 
should only be imposed in accordance with the provisions of the 
Code. To ensure uniform treatment and application of uniform 
standards, binding international dispute resolution should be the 
exclusive method for settling complaints under the Code. 
Chapter 18 of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement ("FfA") 
provides a model for international trade dispute resolution. The 
Agreement calls for binding arbitration in the event a dispute aris-
ing under the FfA cannot be resolved informally.223 As an adjunct 
to the dispute resolution procedures along the lines of the FfA 
Chapter 18 model, the Code might provide for both technical ex-
pert groups and dispute resolution panels such as those established 
by the Standards Code.224 
The original signatories to a Trade and Environment Code 
would probably be OECD member countries, because their envi-
ronmental policies, if not their environmental laws, reflect similarly 
high standards. Furthermore, as the world's largest traders, these 
countries have the most at stake economically. Cooperation on 
environmental matters by these countries is extremely important, 
since the OECD countries also account for most of the world's 
industrial pollution. The details of a Trade and Environment Code 
could be worked out within both GATT and the OECD's regular 
monthly meetings. 
Over time, other countries could be expected to join, particu-
larly China, India, and Brazil. The fact that India, Chile, Korea, 
Mexico, Pakistan, and the Philippines are signatories to the Stand-
ards Code225 suggests that many developing countries would also 
join a Trade and Environment Code. 
221. See id. 
222. Examples of such international agreements include the Montreal Protocol, the 
Basel Convention, and CITES. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
223. Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, supra note 82, arts. 1806-07,27 
I.L.M. at 384-86. 
224. Standards Code, supra note 107, arts. 13-14, reprinted ill BASIC INSTRUMENTS 
AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 26th Supp., at 22-26 (1980). 
225. See THE YEAR IN TRADE 1991, supra note 62, at 48. 
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The market stability and predictability promoted by a Trade 
and Environment Code would provide incentives for all trading 
nations to become signatories. Exporters would be assured that 
PPM-based trade measures could not be imposed unilaterally on. 
their products other than pursuant to internationally agreed upon 
PPM standards. 
V. CONCLUSION 
A multilateral Code approach would best serve the dual goals 
of maintaining an open trade climate while protecting the environ-
ment. The Stockholm and Rio Declarations make clear that threats 
to global development, free trade and the environment can be ad-
dressed without sacrificing one value for the sake of another. Nev-
ertheless, the corresponding issues must be weighed and balanced 
against each other. Accommodation and cooperation-as opposed 
to unilateralism and confrontation-are necessary to achieve a bal-
anced result. Unilateral approaches may yield short-term results, 
but the gains will be at best marginal. Economically resilient coun-
tries will resist the imposition of unilateral trade measures on 
environmental grounds; economically weaker countries that do 
submit will typically not be major polluters; and some major pol-
luters who are economically vulnerable-such as India and 
China-will most likely resist unilateral attempts at forcing them 
to adopt specific environmental measures. 
Unilateralism is far too blunt an instrument of change, as it 
follows a punitive approach rather than a constructive one. Despite 
any short-term symbolic value, unilateralism does not hold out 
great promise for achieving meaningful environmental reforms in 
other countries in the long run. Unilateralism's inflexibility might 
only serve to embitter the target country and stiffen its will to 
maintain the status quO.226 
Unilateral action by the United States to restrict the impacts 
of products manufactured under processes considered to be envi-
226. See Ben Barber, Clinton Faces China Trade Issue, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, 
Apr. 30, 1993, at 3. Even in a multilateral setting, flexibility is important in order to keep 
countries engaged in the negotiating process. See, e.g., Keep Whaling Commission Intact, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 14, 1993, at 20 (noting that inflexible approach taken by 
International Whaling Commission toward Japan and Norway could lead to their with-
drawal from the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling). 
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ronmentally unsound does not advance the goals of either a cleaner 
environment or an open world trading system. As Stevenson and 
Frye note, "It is through multilateral undertakings . . . , not mis-
guided unilateralism, that we can best display our dedication to 
human rights."227 Likewise, the United States can best display its 
mutual respect for free trade and the environment through multi-
lateral action. 
227. Stevenson & Frye, supra note 11, at 58. 
